| Internet-Draft | Abbreviated Title | April 2024 |
| Liu, et al. | Expires 18 October 2024 | [Page] |
This document specifies the system architecture, related processes, token structures, etc., for secure protection of Service-to-Service traffic using WIMSE tokens.¶
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This document specifies the architecture, token format and related mechanism that uses wimse token for securing service-to-service traffic.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
In cloud computing, there exists a type of scenario where one workload invokes another workload, forming a chain of invocation for the workload. In such a scenario, for the next workload, it is necessary to authenticate the identity of the previous invoker workload and the associated software and hardware runtime environment.¶
A specific example is when an AI-enhanced application invokes a Large Language Model instance deployed on a public cloud, it needs to verify the software and hardware runtime environment of the Large Language Model instance. At the same time, this Large Language Model instance needs to further call and use the industry-specific data running on another workload. It then needs to authenticate the invoked Large Language Model instance and the workload of the AI-enhanced application. This forms an authentication chain with the workload invocation chain.¶
This document specifies the system architecture, related processes, token structures, etc., for secure protection of Service-to-Service traffic using WIMSE tokens.¶
As shown in Figure 1, the overall architecture is depicted. There are several roles in this scenario.¶
* Cloud Service Provider¶
The cloud service provider that provides cloud computing services to users, for example, public cloud service provider¶
* Workload¶
A running instance of software executing for a specific purpose. [reference: draft-salowey-wimse-arch-01]¶
* Workload caller¶
The entity that invokes a workload, could be another workload.¶
* Attestation Service provider¶
A provider that provide remote attestation services by executing remote attestation protocols, providing evidence of the hardware and software environment on which the cloud service provider runs workloads.¶
* WIMSE Token¶
Token that used for the authentication and securing service-to-service traffic in this workload chain invoking scenario.¶
The WIMSE token has the following format:¶
It includes several nested JWT structures. As defined by [RFC7519], the (Content Type) Header Parameter of a nested JWT should be set to "JWT".¶
In a chained workload invocation scenario, the method for generating the JWT Token of the workload being called is: sign and encrypt the JWT Token of the calling workload and use it as the payload for the JWT Token of the workload that is being called.¶
The token includes the following claims:¶
The context field can contain various types of information, such as:¶
To achieve interoperability across trust domains, it may be necessary to standardize the context field in different systems so that different service providers and consumers can understand and process this information.¶
{
"alg": "RSA1_5",
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256",
"cty": "JWT"
"payload": {
"iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
"sub": "caller-identity",
"aud": "https://service.example.com",
"exp": 1601519424,
"nbf": 1601519424,
"iat": 1601519424,
"jti": "abc123",
"transaction_id": "tx123",
"context": {
"user_identity": "user-id",
"platform_attestation": "attestation-data",
},
"payload":"caller-JWT-Token",
},
"signature": "TBE5Y3J0VGVzZHBGVbGxpbmc="
}
Federation: If working across multiple trust domains is required, SPIFFE federation or similar mechanisms can be implemented to securely share and verify tokens across domains.¶
TBD¶
TBD¶