Internet-Draft Txn-Tokens March 2024
Tulshibagwale, et al. Expires 17 September 2024 [Page]
Intended Status:
A. Tulshibagwale
G. Fletcher
Capital One
P. Kasselman

Transaction Tokens


Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens) enable workloads in a trusted domain to ensure that user identity and authorization context of an external programmatic request, such as an API invocation, are preserved and available to all workloads that are invoked as part of processing such a request. Txn-Tokens also enable workloads within the trusted domain to optionally immutably assert to downstream workloads that they were invoked in the call chain of the request.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Modern computing architectures often use multiple independently running components called workloads. In many cases, external invocations through externally visible interfaces such as APIs result in a number of internal workloads being invoked in order to process the external invocation. These workloads often run in virtually or physically isolated networks. These networks and the workloads running within their perimeter may be compromised by attackers through software supply chain, privileged user compromise or other attacks. Workloads compromised through external attacks, malicious insiders or software errors can cause any or all of the following unauthorized actions:

The results of these actions are unauthorised access to resources.

2. Overview

Transaction Tokens (Txn-Token) are a means to mitigate damage from such attacks or spurious invocations. A valid Txn-Token indicates a valid external invocation. They ensure that the identity of the user or a workload that made the external request is preserved throughout subsequent workload invocations. They preserve any context such as:

Cryptographically protected Txn-Tokens ensure that downstream workloads cannot make unauthorized modifications to such information, and cannot make spurious calls without the presence of an external trigger.

2.1. What are Transaction Tokens?

Txn-Tokens are short-lived, signed JWTs [RFC7519] that assert the identity of a user or a workload and assert an authorization context. The authorization context provides information expected to remain constant during the execution of a call as it passes through multiple workloads.

2.2. Creating Txn-Tokens

2.2.1. Initial Creation

Txn-Tokens are typically created when a workload is invoked using an endpoint that is externally visible, and is authorized using a separate mechanism, such as an OAuth [RFC6749] access token or an OpenID Connect [OpenIdConnect] ID token. This workload then performs an OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693] to obtain a Txn-Token. To do this, it invokes a special Token Service (the Txn-Token Service) and provides context that is sufficient for it to generate a Txn-Token. This context MAY include:

  • The external authorization token (e.g., the OAuth access token)

  • Parameters that are required to be bound for the duration of this call

  • Additional context, such as the incoming IP address, User Agent information, or other context that can help the Txn-Token Service to issue the Txn-Token

The Txn-Token Service responds to a successful invocation by generating a Txn-Token. The calling workload then uses the Txn-Token to authorize its calls to subsequent workloads. Subsequent workloads may obtain Txn-Tokens of their own.

2.2.2. Replacement Txn-Tokens

A service within a call chain may choose to replace the Txn-Token. This can typically happen if the service wants to add to the context of the current Txn-Token

To get a replacement Txn-Token, a service will request a new Txn-Token from the Txn-Token Service and provide the current Txn-Token and other parameters in the request. The Txn-Token service must exercise caution in what kinds of replacement requests it supports so as to not negate the entire value of Txn-Tokens.

2.3. Txn-Token Lifetime

Txn-Tokens are expected to be short-lived (order of minutes, e.g., 5 minutes), and as a result MAY be used only for the expected duration of an external invocation. If the token or other credential presented to the Txn-Token service when requesting a Txn-Token has an expiration time, then the Txn-Token MUST NOT exceed the lifetime of the originally presented token or credential. If a long-running process such as an batch or offline task is involved, it can use a separate mechanism to perform the external invocation, but the resulting Txn-Token is still short-lived.

2.4. Benefits of Txn-Tokens

Txn-Tokens help prevent spurious invocations by ensuring that a workload receiving an invocation can independently verify the user or workload on whose behalf an external call was made and any context relevant to the processing of the call. Through the presence of additional signatures on the Txn-Token, a workload receiving an invocation can also independently verify that specific workloads were within the path of the call before it was invoked.

2.5. Txn-Token Issuance and Usage Flows

2.5.1. Basic Flow

Figure 1 shows the basic flow of how Txn-Tokens are used in an a multi-workload environment.

     1    ┌──────────────┐    2      ┌──────────────┐
─────────▶│              ├───────────▶              │
          │   External   │           │  Txn-Token   │
     7    │   Endpoint   │    3      │   Service    │
◀─────────┤              ◀───────────│              │
          └────┬───▲─────┘           └──────────────┘
               │   │
             4 │   │ 6
          │              │
          │   Internal   │
          │  µ-service   │
          │              │
               │   │
               ▼   │
             5   o    6
               │   ▲
               │   │
          │              │
          │   Internal   │
          │  µ-service   │
          │              │
Figure 1: Basic Transaction Tokens Architecture
  1. External endpoint is invoked using conventional authorization mechanism such as an OAuth 2.0 Access token

  2. External endpoint provides context and incoming authorization (e.g., access token) to the Txn-Token Service

  3. Txn-Token Service mints a Txn-Token that provides immutable context for the transaction and returns it to the requester

  4. The external endpoint initiates a call to an internal microservice and provides the Txn-Token as authorization

  5. Subsequent calls to other internal microservices use the same Txn-Token to authorize calls

  6. Responses are provided to callers based on successful authorization by the invoked microservices

  7. External client is provided a response to the external invocation

2.5.2. Replacement Txn-Token Flow

An intermediate service may decide to obtain a replacement Txn-Token from the Txn-Token service. That flow is described below in Figure 2

     1    ┌──────────────┐    2      ┌──────────────┐
─────────▶│              ├───────────▶              │
          │   External   │           │              │
     10   │   Endpoint   │    3      │              │
◀─────────┤              ◀───────────│              │
          └────┬───▲─────┘           │              │
               │   │                 │              │
             4 │   │ 9               │              │
          ┌────▼───┴─────┐           │              │
          │              │           │              │
          │   Internal   │           │              │
          │  µ-service   │           │              │
          │              │           │              │
          └────┬───▲─────┘           │  Txn-Token   │
               │   │                 │   Service    │
               ▼   │                 │              │
                 o                   │              │
             5   o    9              │              │
               │ o ▲                 │              │
               │   │                 │              │
               │   │                 │              │
          ┌────▼───┴─────┐    6      │              │
          │              ├───────────▶              │
          │   Internal   │           │              │
          │  µ-service   │    7      │              │
          │              ◀───────────│              │
          └────┬───▲─────┘           │              │
               │   │                 │              │
               ▼   │                 └──────────────┘
             8   o    9
               │   ▲
               │   │
          │              │
          │   Internal   │
          │  µ-service   │
          │              │
Figure 2: Replacement Txn-Token Flow

In the diagram above, steps 1-5 are the same as in Section 2.5.1

  1. An intermediate service determines that it needs to obtain a Replacement Txn-Token. It requests a Replacement Txn-Token from the Txn-Token Service. It passes the incoming Txn-Token in the request, along with any additional context it needs to send the Txn-Token Service.

  2. The Txn-Token Service responds with a replacement Txn-Token

  3. The service that requested the Replacement Txn-Token uses that Txn-Token for downstream call authorization

  4. Responses are provided to callers based on successful authorization by the invoked microservices

  5. External client is provided a response to the external invocation

3. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

4. Terminology


An independent computational unit that can autonomously receive and process invocations, and can generate invocations of other workloads. Examples of workloads include containerized microservices, monolithic services and infrastructure services such as managed databases.

Trust Domain:

A virtually or physically separated network, which contains two or more workloads. The workloads within an Trust Domain may be invoked only through published interfaces. A Trust Domain must have an identifier that is used as the aud (audience) value in Txn-Tokens. The format of this identifier is as defined in the JWT specification [RFC7519].

External Endpoint:

A published interface to an Trust Domain that results in the invocation of a workload within the Trust Domain.

Call Chain:

A sequence of invocations that results from the invocation of an external endpoint.

Transaction Token (Txn-Token):

A signed JWT that has a short lifetime, which provides immutable information about the user or workload, certain parameters of the call and certain contextual attributes of the call.

Authorization Context:

A JSON object containing a set of claims that represent the immutable context of a call chain.

Transaction Token Service (Txn-Token Service):

A special service within the Trust Domain, which issues Txn-Tokens to requesting workloads. Each Trust Domain has exactly one Txn-Token Service.

5. Txn-Token Format

A Txn-Token is a JSON Web Token [RFC7519] protected by a JSON Web Signature [RFC7515]. The following describes the required values in a Txn-Token:

5.1. JWT Header

In the JWT Header:

  • The typ claim MUST be present and MUST have the value txn_token.

  • Key rotation of the signing key SHOULD be supported through the use of a kid claim.

Figure 3 is a non-normative example of the JWT Header of a Txn-Token

    "typ": "txn_token",
    "alg": "RS256",
    "kid": "identifier-to-key"
Figure 3: Example: Txn-Token Header

5.2. JWT Body Claims

The transaction token body follows the JWT format and includes existing JWT claims as well as defines new claims. These claims are described below:


OPTIONAL The iss claim as defined in [RFC7519] is not required as Txn-Tokens are bound to a single trust domain as defined by the aud claim and often the signing keys are known. The iss claim MUST be used in cases where the signing keys are not predetermined or it is desired that the Txn-Token Service signs with unique keys.


REQUIRED The issued at time of the Txn-Token as defined in [RFC7519]


REQUIRED This claim, defined in [RFC7519], contains the trust domain in which the Txn-Token is valid


REQUIRED Expiry time of the Txn-Token as defined in [RFC7519]


REQUIRED A unique transaction identifier as defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC8417]. When used in the transaction token, it identifies the entire call chain.


REQUIRED A unique identifier for the subject as defined by the aud trust domain. Unlike OpenID Connect, the sub claim is NOT associated with the iss claim.


REQUIRED A String defining the purpose or intent of this transaction.


OPTIONAL A JSON object that conatains values that remain immutable throughout the call chain.


OPTIONAL A JSON object that describes the environmental context of the requested transaction.

5.2.1. Requester Context

The Txn-Token SHOULD contain an rctx claim. This MAY include the IP address information of the originating user, as well as information about the computational entity that requested the Txn-Token and contextual attributes of the originating request itself.

The JSON value of the rctx claim MAY include any values the Txn-Token Service determines are interesting to downstream services that rely on the Txn-Token. The following claims are defined so that if they are included, they have the following meaning:

  • req_ip The IP address of the requester. This MAY be the end-user or a robotic process that requested the Transaction

  • authn The authentication method used to idenitfy the requester. Its value is a StringOrURI that uniquely identifies the method used.

  • req_wl The requesting workload. A StringOrURI that uniquely identifies the computational entity that requested the Txn-Token. This entity MUST be within the Trust Domain of the Txn-Token. If a replacement Txn-Token has been requested, then this claim will be an array of StringOrURIs representing the different workloads that have requested Txn-Tokens as part of the transaction processing. Requesting Workload Identifier

It is useful to be able to track the set of workloads that have requested a Txn-Token. The req_wl claim allows for tracking this information even through requests for a replacement Txn-Token. By default the req_wl is a StringOrURI representing the original workload entity that requested the Txn-Token. However, if a workload within the path of servicing the transaction requests a replacement Txn-Token, then the Transaction Token Service will append the new requesting workload as a subsequent array element in the req_wl claim. This provides a "pathing" mechanism to track which services have requested replacement Txn-Tokens. If there is only a single value the req_wl will be a StringOrURI. If there is more than a single value, then req_wl will be prepresented by an array of StringOrURIs.

    "rctx": {
      "req_ip": "", // env context of external call
      "authn": "urn:ietf:rfc:6749", // env context of the external call
      "req_wl": [ "", "" ]

5.2.2. Example

The figure below Figure 4 shows a non-normative example of the JWT body of a Txn-Token:

    "iat": "1686536226000",
    "aud": "trust-domain.example",
    "exp": "1686536526000",
    "txn": "97053963-771d-49cc-a4e3-20aad399c312",
    "sub": "d084sdrt234fsaw34tr23t",
    "rctx": {
      "req_ip": "", // env context of external call
      "authn": "urn:ietf:rfc:6749", // env context of the external call
      "req_wl": "" // the internal entity that requested the Txn-Token
    "purp" : "trade.stocks",
    "azd": {
        "action": "BUY", // parameter of external call
        "ticker": "MSFT", // parameter of external call
        "quantity": "100", // parameter of external call
        "user_level": "vip" // computed value not present in external call
Figure 4: Example: Txn-Token Body

6. Txn-Token Service

A Txn-Token Service defines a profile of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693] endpoint that can respond to Txn-Token issuance requests. This profile of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693] specification MUST be used to obtain Txn-Tokens. The unique properties of the Txn-Token requests and responses are described below. The Txn-Token Service MAY optionally support other OAuth 2.0 endpoints and features, but that is not a requirement for it to be a Txn-Token Service.

Each Trust Domain MUST have exactly one logical Txn-Token Service.

7. Requesting Txn-Tokens

A workload requests a Txn-Token from a Transaction Token Service using a profile of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693]. Txn-Tokens may be requested for both externally originating or internally originating requests. The profile describes how required and optional context can be provided to the Transaction Token Service in order for the Txn-Token to be issued. The request to obtain a Txn-Token using this method is called a Txn-Token Request, and a successful response is called a Txn-Token Response. The Txn-Token profile of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693] is described below.

7.1. Txn-Token Request

A workload requesting a Txn-Token must provide the Transaction Token Service with proof of its identity (client authentication), the purpose of the Txn-Token and optionally any additional context relating to the transaction being performed. Most of these elements are provided by the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification and the rest are defined as new parameters. Additionally, this profile defines a new token type URN urn:ieft:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token which is used by the requesting workload to identify that it is requesting the Txn-Token Response to contain a Txn-Token.

To request a Txn-Token the workload invokes the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] token endpoint with the following parameters: * grant_type REQUIRED. The value MUST be set to urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange * audience REQUIRED. The value MUST be set to the Trust Domain name * scope REQUIRED. A space-delimited list of case-sensitive strings where the value(s) MUST represent the specific purpose or intent of the transaction. * requested_token_type REQUIRED. The value MUST be urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token * subject_token REQUIRED. The value MUST represent the subject of the transaction. This could be an OAuth access_token received by an API Gateway, a JWT assertion constructed by a workload initiating a transaction or a simple string value all identified by subject_token_type. * subject_token_type REQUIRED. The value MUST indicate the type of the token or value present in the subject_token parameter

The following additional parameters MAY be present in a Txn-Token Request:

  • request_context OPTIONAL. This parameter contains a base64url encoded JSON object which represents the context of this transaction. The parameter SHOULD be present and how the Transaction Token Service uses this parameter is out of scope for this specification.

  • request_details OPTIONAL. This parameter contains a base64url encoded JSON object which represents additional details of the transaction that MUST remain immutable throughout the processing of the transaction by multiple workloads.

The requesting workload MUST authenticate its identity to the Transaction Token Service. The exact client authentication mechanism used is outside the scope of this specification.

Figure 5 shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Request.

POST /txn-token-service/token_endpoint HTTP 1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Figure 5: Example: Txn-Token Request

7.2. Txn-Token Request Processing

When the Transaction Token Service receives a Txn-Token Request it MUST validate the requesting workload client authentication and determine if that workload is authorized to obtain the Txn-Tokens with the requested values. The authorization policy for determining such issuance is out of scope for this specification.

Next, the Transaction Token Service MUST validate the subject_token and determine the value to specify as the sub of the issued Txn-Token. The Txn-Token Service MUST ensure the sub value is unique within the trust domain defined by the aud claim.

The Transaction Token Service MUST set the iat claim to the time of issuance of the Txn-Token. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the aud claim to a Trust Domain of the Transaction Token Service. If the Transaction Token Service supports multiple trust domains, then it MUST determine the correct aud value for this request. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the exp claim to the expiry time of the Txn-Token. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the txn claim to a unique ID specific to this transaction.

The Transaction Token Service MAY set the iss claim of the Txn-Token to a value defining the entity that signed the Txn-Token. This claim MUST be ommitted if not set.

The Transaction Token Service MUST evaluate the value specified in the scope parameter of the request to determine the purp claim of the issued Txn-Token.

If a request_context parameter is present in the Txn-Token Request, the data SHOULD be added to the rctx object of the Txn-Token. In addition, the Transaction Token Service SHOULD add the authenticated requesting workload identifier in the rctx object as the req_wl claim.

If a request_details parameter is present in the Txn-Token Request, then the Transaction Token Service SHOULD propagate the data from the request_details object into the claims in the azd object as authorized by the Transaction Token Service authorization policy for the requesting client.

The Transaction Token Service MAY provide additional processing and verification that is outside the scope of this specification.

7.3. Txn-Token Response

A successful response to a Txn-Token Request by a Transaction Token Service is called a Txn-Token Response. If the Transaction Token Service responds with an error, the error response is as described in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749]. The following describes required values of a Txn-Token Response:

  • The token_type value MUST be set to N_A per guidance in OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693]

  • The access_token value MUST be the Txn-Token JWT

  • The issued_token_type value MUST bet set to urn:ieft:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token

  • The response MUST NOT include the values expires_in, refresh_token and scope

Figure 6 shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Response.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

  "token_type": "N_A",
  "issued_token_type": "urn:ieft:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token",
  "access_token": "eyJCI6IjllciJ9...Qedw6rx"
Figure 6: Example: Txn-Token Response

7.4. Creating Replacement Txn-Tokens

A workload within a call chain may request the Transaction Token Server to replace a Txn-Token.

Workloads MAY request replacement Txn-Tokens in order to change (add to, remove or modify) the asserted values within a Txn-Token.

The values of the sub and aud claims MUST remain unchanged in a replacement Txn-Token. If the claim rctx is present in the original Txn-Token, then it MUST be present and unchanged in the replacement Txn-Token except for the req_wl claim which MUST be updated to include the requesting workload identifier.

7.4.1. Txn-Token Service Responsibilities

A Txn-Token Service replacing a Txn-Token must consider that modifying previously asserted values from existing Txn-Tokens can completely negate the benefits of Txn-Tokens. When issuing replacement Txn-Tokens, a Transaction Token Server therefore:

  • MAY enable modifications to asserted values that reduce the scope of permitted actions

  • MAY enable additional asserted values

  • SHOULD NOT enable modification to asserted values that expand the scope of permitted actions

7.4.2. Replacement Txn-Token Request

To request a replacement Txn-Token, the requester makes a Txn-Token Request as described in Section 7.1 but includes the Txn-Token to be replaced as the value of the subject_token parameter.

7.4.3. Replacement Txn-Token Response

A successful response by the Transaction Token Server to a Replacement Txn-Token Request is a Txn-Token Response as described in Section 7.3

7.5. Mutual Authentication of the Txn-Token Request

A Txn-Token Service MUST ensure that it authenticates any workloads requesting Txn-Tokens. In order to do so:

  • It MUST name a limited, pre-configured set of workloads that MAY request Txn-Tokens

  • It MUST individually authenticate the requester as being one of the named requesters

  • It SHOULD rely on mechanisms, such as [Spiffe] or some other means of performing MTLS [RFC8446], to securely authenticate the requester

  • It SHOULD NOT rely on insecure mechanisms, such as long-lived shared secrets to authenticate the requesters

The requesting workload MUST have a pre-configured location for the Transaction Token Service. It SHOULD rely on mechanisms, such as [Spiffe], to securely authenticate the Transaction Token Service before making a Txn-Token Request.

8. Using Txn-Tokens

Txn-Tokens need to be communicated between workloads that depend upon them to authorize the request. Such workloads will often present HTTP [RFC9110] interfaces for being invoked by other workloads. This section specifies the HTTP header the invoking workload MUST use to communicate the Txn-Token to the invoked workload, when the invoked workload presents an HTTP interface. Note that the standard HTTP Authorization header MUST NOT be used because that may be used by the workloads to communicate channel authorization.

8.1. Txn-Token HTTP Header

A workload that invokes another workload using HTTP and needs to present a Txn-Token to the invoked workload MUST use the HTTP Header Txn-Token to communicate the Txn-Token. The value of this header MUST be the JWT that represents the Txn-Token.

9. Security Considerations

9.1. Txn-Token Lifetime

A Txn-Token is not resistant to replay attacks. A long-lived Txn-Token therefore represents a risk if it is stored in a file, discovered by an attacker, and then replayed. For this reason, a Txn-Token lifetime must be kept short, not exceeding the lifetime of a call-chain. Even for long-running "batch" jobs, a longer lived access token should be used to initiate the request to the batch endpoint. It then obtains short-lived Txn-Tokens that may be used to authorize the call to downstream services in the call-chain.

Because Txn-Tokens are short-lived, the Txn-Token response from the Txn-Token service does not contain the refresh_token field. A Txn-Token cannot be issued by presenting a refresh_token.

The expires_in and scope fields of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification [RFC8693] are also not used in Txn-Token responses. The expires_in is not required since the issued token has an exp field, which indicates the token lifetime. The scope field is omitted from the request and therefore omitted in the response.

9.2. Access Tokens

When creating Txn-Tokens, the Txn-Token MUST NOT contain the Access Token presented to the external endpoint. If an Access Token is included in a Txn-Token, an attacker may extract the Access Token from the Txn-Token, and replay it to any Resource Server that can accept that Access Token. Txn-Token expiry does not protect against this attack since the Access Token may remain valid even after the Txn-Token has expired.

9.3. Client Authentication

How requesting clients authenticate to the Transaction Token Service is out of scope for this specification. However, if using the actor_token and actor_token_type parameters of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification, both parameters MUST be present in the request. The actor_token MUST autenticate the identity of the requesting workload.

10. Privacy Considerations

10.1. Obsfucation of Personal Information

Some rctx claims may be considered personal information in some jurisdictions and if so their values need to be obsfucated. For example, originating IP address (req_ip) is often considerd personal information and in that case must be protected through some obsfucation method (e.g. SHA256).

11. IANA Considerations

This specification registers the following claims defined in Section Section 5.1 to the OAuth Access Token Types Registry defined in [RFC6749], and the following claims defined in Section Section 5.2 in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims Registry defined in [RFC7519]

11.1. OAuth Registry Contents

  • Name: txn_token

  • Description: JWT of type Transaction Token

  • Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters: none

  • HTTP Authentication Schemes: TLS [RFC8446]

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document: Section Section 5.1 of this specificaiton

11.2. JWT Registry Contents

  • Claim Name: azd

    • Claim Description: The authorization context details

    • Change Controller: IESG

    • Specification Document: Section Section 5.2 of this specification

  • Claim Name: rctx

    • Claim Description: The requester context

    • Change Controller: IESG

    • Specification Document: Section Section 5.2.1 of this specification

  • Claim Name: purp

    • Claim Description: The purpose of the transaction

    • Change Controller: IESG

    • Specification Document: Section Section 5.2 of this specification

12. References

12.1. Normative References

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <>.
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <>.
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <>.
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, , <>.
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, , <>.
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <>.
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <>.
Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, , <>.
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, , <>.
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. de., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", , <>.

12.2. Informative References

Cloud Native Computing Foundation, "Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone", n.d., <>.



Dr. Kelley W. Burgin, PhD.
MITRE Corporation
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity
Evan Gilman
Kai Lehmann
1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH
Arndt Schwenkschuster
Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Ltd.

Authors' Addresses

Atul Tulshibagwale
George Fletcher
Capital One
Pieter Kasselman