-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY * SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE * NAA Report -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION Draft General Report Sir Peter EMERY (United Kingdom) General Rapporteur* International Secretariat October 1993 * Until this document has been approved by the Scientific and Technical Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii INTRODUCTION 1 I. THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATION 2 A. Demand 2 1. The Middle East and North Africa 2 2. Southern Asia 6 3. North-East Asia 7 4. The Risks of Internal Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union 10 5. South Africa and Latin America 11 B. Supply 12 1. China 12 2. The Former Soviet Union 12 3. South-South Trade 13 4. Transfers from Western Countries 13 II. THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 13 A. The Traditional Regime 14 1. The Legal Basis For Non-Proliferatio 14 2. Restrictions Imposed by the Traditional Suppliers 15 B. Recent Trends 16 1. Improvement of Controls and Transparency 16 2. Action by the Suppliers 18 III. THE NPT EXTENSION CONFERENCE IN 1995 19 A. Nuclear Testing 20 1. Test Ban History 20 2. Policies on Nuclear Testing 22 3. Negotiating a Test Ban 24 B. The Outlook for 1995 25 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Nuclear proliferation poses a grave threat to international stability. Several recent developments have underlined this threat including discoveries the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme; the revelation that South Africa successfully developed nuclear weapons; and North Korea's threat to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Attention is even more focused on proliferation as the 1995 NPT renewal conference approaches. An indefinite extension of the NPT is the most desirable outcome of this conference but this goal faces many obstacles. In particular, the developing world has often accused the declared nuclear weapons states of not fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the NPT. Recent progress in reducing nuclear arsenals should restrain some of this criticism but agreement on a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing is seen by many as the key to the likely success or failure of the NPT renewal conference. The nuclear test moratoria declared by France, Russia and the United States show a new willingness to produce a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Such a Treaty should be formulated and agreed upon by the declared nuclear weapons states before the 1995 NPT renewal conference. Even if the agreement permits some nuclear tests to take place after that date, there should be a clear timetable for a rapid end to nuclear tests. Extending the NPT indefinitely is not the only option for curbing nuclear proliferation. Emerging nuclear suppliers and existing ones which are not part of the Nuclear Suppliers Club should be encouraged to join it and, at the very least, to implement similar export controls and monitoring. Of these controls, probably the most important is a full-scope safeguards agreement between the customer nation and the IAEA as a condition of nuclear-related sales. Such agreements allow the IAEA to mount special inspections at undeclared suspect sites, a new ability which is one of several welcome IAEA initiatives. Another is the ability to act upon information provided by external sources - such as national intelligence services - instead of depending solely upon its own resources. Other measures which would enhance the Non-Proliferation regime include reducing the definition of a "significant quantity" of nuclear material to reflect technical progress in producing nuclear weapons with less fissile material; extra resources for the IAEA to fulfil its safeguards obligations adequately; more efficient use of IAEA resources to ensure that safeguards implemented in a particular nation reflect the proliferation threat it poses; the acceptance of quotas of "challenge" inspections to "de-stigmatize" such inspections; a study of the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention to reveal any possible lessons for nuclear proliferation; and full support for initiatives aimed at limiting and monitoring production facilities for producing fissile material with weapons potential. In addition, any settlement of the dispute with North Korea on its suspect sites must guarantee that the North Korean nuclear programme does not have a military component. Finally, new ideas should be formulated for future drastic reductions in nuclear forces to the absolute minimum. This might be achieved ultimately by placing them under some form of international control. INTRODUCTION (1) 1. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons has been and will continue to be one of the main concerns of civilized society. All must therefore be worried that in March 1993, South African President de Klerk announced that his nation had successfully developed nuclear weapons in the 1970s. This announcement provided another instance of the inadequacy of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It also underlined concerns about North Korea's nuclear weapons programme following its declared intention just a few weeks earlier to withdraw from the NPT. 2. Since the Gulf War in 1991 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, nuclear proliferation has emerged as one of the main threats to international stability and security. Not since 1974 when India conducted a nuclear test has nuclear proliferation occupied such a prominent place on the international agenda. 3. Several factors have combined to generate such concern. Iraq demonstrated that even a poorly industrialized country that is party to the NPT can get very close to assembling a nuclear weapon. Indeed, had it not been for the Gulf War and its aftermath, Iraq might have already produced a nuclear explosive device. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused concern about possible "leakage" of nuclear weapons expertise, material, and technology which could command a high price on the illicit nuclear market. 4. Fuelling concern still further are the particular circumstances of the nations considered most likely to be conducting covert nuclear weapons programmes. These include political, economic and social instability as well as unresolved conflicts which continually threaten to re-emerge. 5. At the same time, nations believed to possess covert nuclear weapons programmes often seem to possess parallel programmes to develop or acquire missile delivery systems. This potential combination of capabilities naturally causes alarm among neighbouring nations and their allies. 6. All these elements show a clear need to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. This regime was greatly discredited by the discovery of the Iraqi nuclear programme and the revelations about how far advanced it was and South Africa's disclosures have further undermined confidence in international nuclear controls. Put simply, there is great concern that without tighter nuclear controls, a nuclear proliferation "cascade" could occur whereby countries, anxious for their security, reconsider their non-nuclear status and contribute to both horizontal and vertical proliferation. (2) 7. It is important that urgent attention be paid to nuclear proliferation now. In 1995, the parties to the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty must decide the future of the Treaty. The NPT entered into force in 1970 and, in accordance with Article VIII, review conferences have been held every five years since then. In 1995, however, in accordance with Article X, the NPT renewal conference will take place. This conference will determine whether the Treaty should remain in force indefinitely or will remain in force for an additional fixed period or periods. The purpose of this Report is to provide an account of what is currently known (or suspected) about nuclear proliferation and to illustrate the shortcomings of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finally, the Report recommends measures that could be taken to make it more difficult to acquire nuclear weapons. I. THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATION A. Demand 1. The Middle East and North Africa a. Israel 8. Israel has long been suspected of having a nuclear weapons development programme. Israeli leaders have always asserted that the State of Israel, though not a signatory to the NPT, "would not be the first to bring nuclear weapons into the Middle East". Israel is nevertheless a de facto nuclear power, thought to possess 60 to 100 nuclear weapons based on its probable production capacities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Dimona nuclear facility in the Negev Desert is not subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In December 1991 Israel stated that half the 20 tonnes of heavy water imported from Norway in the 1960s had been lost, thus giving credence to the theory that it had been diverted for military purposes. In 1992 Israel and the United States began negotiations on the future of the Israeli nuclear arsenal, with a view to halting production of plutonium at the Dimona reactor. 9. Israel's nuclear programme is seen as a key motive for covert nuclear weapons efforts in neighbouring nations. It may also stimulate them to acquire chemical weapons, often described as the "poor man's bomb". b. Iraq 10. Iraq proved that a state could develop a nuclear capability without being highly industrialized and despite being a party to the NPT. Indeed, Iraq's accession to the NPT facilitated its access to a variety of nuclear technologies which Iraqi scientists ingeniously adapted to military purposes. Some "non-sensitive" technologies were used, for instance, in uranium enrichment facilities. 11. Iraq's Gulf War defeat in 1991 and the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 have - for the time being at least - halted Iraq's military nuclear programme. Resolution 687 provides for the identification and elimination of Iraq's military nuclear capabilities and monitoring to ensure continued compliance with the ban. To this end a special commission has been set up in co-operation with the IAEA to locate and eliminate weapons of mass destruction (3) and their production facilities. This is the first time the Security Council has taken tangible and mandatory disarmament measures, the first example of enforced United Nations arms control. 12. In September 1991 inspections revealed that a large-scale nuclear weapons design programme had been under way since the 1970s, under the codename Petrochemical 3 (PC3), aimed primarily at acquiring enriched uranium. About 40 kilograms of enriched uranium were acquired. The special commission found that Iraq was pursuing its research into both centrifugal and electromagnetic enrichment to diversify its sources of access to military-grade uranium. Iraq was attempting to build a "traditional" uranium nuclear explosive and a miniature hybrid atomic/thermonuclear device. IAEA experts estimated in March 1992 that Iraq was three to four years away from producing a nuclear explosive. 13. It is difficult to eradicate the Iraqi nuclear threat entirely. The expertise does not disappear with the destruction of facilities and it is also possible that Iraq has managed to hide some equipment, or even some of its stockpile of enriched uranium. According to David Kay, Secretary-General of the Uranium Institute in London, many items of equipment of Western origin have indeed yet to be located, notably those that would allow resumption of mass production of the centrifuges necessary for uranium enrichment. c. Iran 14. Iran is thought to have begun its military nuclear programme under the regime of the Shah and then to have suspended its activities for a while after the 1979 revolution. Iran is certainly attempting to acquire a wide variety of nuclear technologies but it maintains that this is to support its civil nuclear programme which includes completion of several reactors started in the 1970s as well the construction of new facilities. Concern arises because Iraq was able to build up its military nuclear programme under similar circumstances and it is notoriously difficult to assess Iranian intentions. In addition, there have been many press accounts of - vigorously denied - Iranian attempts to recruit nuclear weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union and even to purchase Soviet nuclear weapons. Certainly, enrichment technologies have been purchased from China and Pakistan. China supplied a research reactor in 1985 and has agreed to supply two 300 MW reactors. Iran is also attempting to conclude an agreement with Russia to supply two reactors and negotiations have taken place with Argentina and India for the supply of other nuclear equipment and material. New military facilities are alleged to have been opened in Isfahan and Karaj. Military research is said to be located near the Caspian Sea, at the Mohalem Kalayah centre, which comprises two uranium enrichment laboratories and a nuclear reactor supplied by India and using Soviet technology. Two uranium mines are also being operated at full capacity. 15. Iran, which became a party to the NPT in 1970, has acceded to the comprehensive safeguards agreement on sensitive nuclear materials. An IAEA inspection in February 1992 did not reveal any suspect activity on the six officially acknowledged sites but, according to some opposition sources, the IAEA team did not inspect the controversial Mohalem Kalayah site, but another site with the same name. The IAEA has only declared that there are no illicit nuclear activities at DECLARED sites. It is interesting to note that one member of the IAEA inspection team described the inspections as a "whitewash" and the IAEA has acknowledged that Iran could have facilities which have not been inspected. 16. According to the Iranian opposition, the country has enough enriched uranium to manufacture a rudimentary bomb. A preliminary CIA report stated that Iran could manufacture a nuclear weapon before the end of the century (4), an assessment which explains recent American pressure on China, India and Argentina to prevent the delivery of a Chinese or Indian reactor and Argentinian materials necessary for manufacture of nuclear fuel. d. Syria 17. Syria has been pursuing a nuclear programme since 1979, the year in which the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission was created. There are some signs of Syrian interest in nuclear weapons development. In October 1991, Syria attempted to acquire a research reactor from China, which referred the approach to the IAEA. The planned 30 KW reactor could not have produced fissionable materials for military applications, but the Agency nevertheless rejected the request due to Syria's refusal to make all its nuclear facilities subject to inspection. Negotiations are taking place with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement. If this is concluded, the United States has said that it would support the sale of the Chinese reactor and the sale of about one kilogram of highly enriched uranium for research purposes. e. Algeria 18. Algeria has substantial oil reserves and is therefore not dependent on nuclear energy. In January 1991, however, details emerged about the nature of the A n Oussera nuclear complex 1125 kilometres south of Algiers which raised questions about Algerian nuclear intentions. Suspicions were naturally raised by the cloak of secrecy which surrounded the project which began in 1983 with construction commencing in 1987. The complex is within the prohibited airspace of a nearby military airfield, which prevents overflight and it is surrounded by a security zone which includes a minefield and surface-to-air missile batteries. The dimensions of the cooling tower suggest that the reactor - of Chinese origin and scheduled for completion in 1993 - would be able to produce eight kilograms of plutonium a year. According to Algeria and China the station's power output is no more than 15 MW, which seems too large for strictly peaceful research and provides the ability to produce enough plutonium to manufacture about one nuclear weapon per year. That said, Algeria is dependent on imports for its enriched uranium and heavy water supplies and has no reprocessing capability. 19. In January 1992, President Chadli Benjedid announced Algeria's intention to accede to the NPT and in February 1992, signed an inspection agreement with the IAEA. This agreement permits inspections to ensure that the reactor, the nuclear fuel, and the heavy water are not diverted to nuclear weapons development. f. Libya 20. Despite being a party to the NPT, Libya has made efforts to acquire sensitive materials and technologies, so far without success. It is rumoured that Libya has offered to take over India's and Pakistan's national debt in exchange for nuclear weapons and that it sought to purchase a nuclear weapon from China. In fact, trade has successfully been confined to civil areas. 21. Colonel Kadhafi has for a long time been openly pro-nuclear in his speeches. In April 1990 he said to a gathering of Libyan scientists and students: "Imagine a deterrence industry for the entire Arab world. It would deter imperialism and Zionism ... We must therefore build that force." Despite the rhetoric, Libya's modest civil nuclear facilities are subject to safeguards as are its exports of uranium. The latter only became safeguarded in 1980, however, and it is believed that Libya exported significant quantities to Pakistan. 2. Southern Asia: Nuclear Competition between India and Pakistan a. India (5) 22. India conducted a nuclear explosion "for peaceful purposes" in 1974 and is now considered a de facto nuclear power. It is discreet about its nuclear capabilities and has joined the IAEA, while rejecting full application of the safeguards machinery. 23. Besides nuclear facilities which are subject to inspection, India operates others which are not. These include two nuclear power plants, (Madras I and II), two reprocessing plants at Dhruva and Tarapur, and a 100 MW research reactor at Dhruva. India is also maintaining a programme of uranium enrichment by centrifuge which ought to be able to produce several kilograms of weapons-grade uranium each year. It is also probable that the Bhabha atomic research centre is interested in manufacturing a thermonuclear bomb. 24. In view of the capabilities of its installations, India is considered to have a stockpile of 290 kilograms of plutonium, enough fissile material to manufacture about 50 bombs. That stockpile is expected to grow to 400 kilograms by 1995. Even if it has not yet assembled, or perhaps even deployed nuclear weapons, it has the capacity to do so at very short notice. 25. Deprived of Soviet support and in the grip of economic difficulties, India needs to improve its relations with the United States and the Western countries. New Delhi, considering the NPT to be discriminatory, maintains its right to arm itself with nuclear weapons and torpedoed the proposal - put forward by Pakistan and taken up by the United States - for a regional nuclear disarmament conference, in which India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States would have participated. The Hindu fundamentalist opposition is also urging the Indian Government to acknowledge its military nuclear status officially. India nevertheless maintains its position on "non-discriminatory" bans and advocates a universal prohibition on nuclear testing and production of plutonium and enriched uranium. b. Pakistan 26. After India and Israel, Pakistan is considered the third unofficial nuclear power. Pakistan is an IAEA member but not a party to the NPT which, like India, it considers discriminatory. It embarked on a nuclear programme to compensate for the conventional superiority and nuclear advances of its Indian rival, and possibly to assume nuclear leadership of the Islamic world. Its nuclear programme has received substantial Chinese assistance both technically and in the supply of enriched uranium. 27. The Pakistani programme concentrates on production of enriched uranium by centrifuge at the Kahuta complex, which is not subject to IAEA control. According to the authorities, the degree of enrichment is inadequate for military applications, but Pakistan is thought to have enough fissile material to manufacture about 10 atomic bombs. Detonator tests were also carried out between 1985 and 1986. 28. In February 1992, during a visit to the United States, the Pakistani Foreign Minister publicly acknowledged that his country had the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, saying that it had "elements which put together would become a device" (6). In 1990, the United States cut off $573 million in aid because of concerns about Pakistan's nuclear activities. Pakistan has declared that it has ceased production of nuclear weapon "cores" but refuses to destroy existing cores, the condition for the reinstatement of American aid. In July 1993, a retired Pakistani general, Mirza Aslam Beg, was quoted as saying that Pakistan had conducted successful laboratory tests on a nuclear weapon in 1987. He subsequently denied this statement. 29. In 1988 India and Pakistan concluded an agreement prohibiting them from destroying or damaging each other's nuclear facilities and have exchanged lists of facilities under the terms of this agreement. Each has accused the other of failing to declare gas centrifuge facilities. 3. North-East Asia: Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula a. North Korea 30. On 12 March 1993, North Korea gave notice that it intended to withdraw from the NPT. There were immediate calls for the imposition of sanctions on North Korea and the matter was referred to the United Nations Security Council by the IAEA. China declared its opposition to sanctions, thus rendering it likely that concerted United Nations actions would be very limited since China has a veto on the Security Council. Other nations, however, voiced their alarm at North Korea's actions and began to assess what measures could be taken to reverse North Korea's decision. 31. North Korea signed the NPT in 1985 under pressure from China, the Soviet Union and the United States following the discovery of a third nuclear reactor under construction at Yongbyon. It delayed conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA until January 1992 following the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from South Korea and after agreement had been reached with South Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This latter agreement included an undertaking that neither nation would operate nuclear reprocessing plants. 32. Before the first of six IAEA inspections commencing in May 1992, North Korea submitted an information document detailing its nuclear facilities. These included a 2 MW reactor, pushed to 8 MW, of Soviet origin, a 50 MW reactor, a 200 MW reactor nearing completion, a 5 MW experimental reactor, and a reprocessing plant under construction. The Korean authorities did not acknowledge a reprocessing capability at the Yongbyon complex which might be able to produce six to eight kilograms of plutonium a year. The CIA estimates that North Korea may have enough plutonium to manufacture one nuclear explosive and some sources suggest that enough material for up to six devices may have been diverted. 33. It is thought likely that the delay between signing the NPT and admitting IAEA inspectors enabled North Korea to move away sensitive equipment. In addition, the inspectors did not have access to all facilities including nuclear waste sites. This is an extremely important omission because Western intelligence sources had provided the IAEA with information about two suspected nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon which North Korea claims are unrelated military facilities. Satellite photographs are said to have revealed the construction of a nuclear waste storage facility which was subsequently disguised as a military building. Information provided by North Korea about its nuclear waste does not tally with normal operating practices at a power plant and the IAEA believes that "kilogram quantities" of plutonium are not accounted for. 34. On 25 February 1993, the IAEA demanded special inspections within one month at Yongbyon. Rather than submit to special inspections, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (7). In March, communications between the IAEA and North Korea failed to resolve the issue so in April the IAEA reported on the matter to the United Nations Security Council. 35. On 8 April, the Security Council reaffirmed the importance of the NPT and its support for the North-South Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It also welcomed all efforts aimed at resolving the situation. On 11 May, the Security Council adopted Resolution 825, calling upon North Korea to reconsider its decision and reaffirm its commitment to the NPT. It also calls upon North Korea to honour its NPT obligations and comply with its safeguards agreement. The Resolution requested the Director General of the IAEA to continue to consult with North Korea with a view to resolving the issues contained in the IAEA's report on North Korea and to report back to the Security Council. The Resolution urged all nations to encourage North Korea to respond positively to the Resolution and facilitate a solution to the issue. The Resolution also stated that the Security Council will continue to be informed of any developments and will "consider further action" as necessary. 36. China had made it clear it would use its veto against any collective sanctions so the Resolution was carefully worded to avoid a Chinese veto. Since North Korea's main trading partner is China, sanctions would not be effective without Chinese agreement. China and Pakistan both abstained from the vote so the resolution was adopted 13 in favour and none against. Some other nations expressed concern that the international community might be operating a double standard on nuclear proliferation. Malaysia and Indonesia, for instance, expressed the view that the United States should not exert more pressure on North Korea than it had done on Israel and South Africa. 37. On 12 May, North Korea rejected the Security Council resolution saying that the withdrawal had been a self-defence measure against the increased nuclear threats posed by the United States. 38. During the course of May and early June, the United States and North Korea held discussions and China was also reported to have been in communication with North Korea. On 11 June, the day before North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was due to come into force, North Korea announced that it would suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and would continue to allow the IAEA to apply nuclear safeguards. This did not include inspections at the suspect sites. 39. This decision was not a reversal of the decision and tensions remained high. Indeed, in July during a visit to South Korea, President Clinton warned North Korea that the development and use of nuclear weapons by North Korea would "mean the end of their country as they know it". 40. Subsequently, North Korea and the IAEA resumed talks on inspections at suspect sites and the United States offered its assistance in converting North Korea's nuclear reactors to make them less suitable for producing fissionable material for nuclear weapons. Whether negotiations are a stalling tactic by North Korea or a serious attempt to resolve the problem remains to be seen. The disclosure in July that North Korea had tested a missile, the Nodong 1, with a range of 1,000 kilometres and with the potential to carry nuclear, chemical or biological payloads has clearly fuelled concern about its intentions. b. Other States 41. The proliferation threat in North-East Asia is essentially now confined to North Korea. The Republic of Korea and Taiwan have both conducted questionable activities in the past but abandoned them mainly due to pressure from the United States. That said, if North Korea is ultimately seen as posing a nuclear threat to its neighbours, other nations might seek a deterrent. In this context, it is interesting to note that Japan's former Liberal Democratic government had expressed reluctance to support an indefinite extension of the NPT because of the emerging threat from North Korea. The present ruling coalition has, however, declared its backing for an indefinite extension. 4. The Risks of Internal Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (8) 42. Four successor states to the former Soviet Union inherited nuclear weapons and of those only Russia has declared its intention to remain a nuclear weapons state. All the tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union were consolidated within Russia during the first half of 1992. Implementation of the START I Treaty and the accompanying Lisbon Protocol will similarly consolidate strategic nuclear weapons, leaving Russia the sole successor state with nuclear weapons. The other three states concerned (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) have declared that they will accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Belarus has signed and ratified the NPT and START I; Kazakhstan has ratified START I but has not yet signed the NPT; Ukraine has not ratified START I and it has not signed the NPT. Almost a quarter of the former Soviet Union's strategic nuclear arsenal was based in Ukraine and, although it continues to declare its intention to renounce nuclear weapons, some parliamentarians have suggested that Ukraine should retain them. Certainly, Ukraine is concerned about its relationship with Russia and wants assurances that Russia will not use conventional or nuclear weapons against Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine feels that offers of Western aid for weapons dismantlement are inadequate and may well be using its current nuclear status as a bargaining chip. 5. South Africa and Latin America 43. Grouping South Africa and Latin America together is not as unusual as it might appear. Both regions are diminishing as proliferation threats largely through increasing democratization and a relative easing of regional tensions. The result is somewhat ironic. In southern Africa and Latin America, three non-NPT-signatory states have formally abandoned their military nuclear programmes while in the Middle East and north-east Asia several NPT states show obvious risks of proliferation. a. South Africa 44. As mentioned earlier, on 24 March 1992, President F. W. de Klerk of South Africa announced that by 1989 South Africa had built six nuclear weapons in a programme that began in 1974. President de Klerk said that all the weapons had been dismantled and that the fissile material had been returned to the civil nuclear programme. South Africa signed the NPT in July 1991 after the weapons had been dismantled and all the relevant hardware and designs had been destroyed. Since then IAEA inspectors have certified that all fissile material has been accounted for and that a nuclear test site detected by American satellites in 1977 has never been used. 45. In 1979, a mysterious double flash was detected near Prince Edward Island in the south Atlantic and there has been much speculation that this resulted from a South African nuclear test, possibly conducted jointly with Israel. President de Klerk, however, has denied that any tests were conducted and has also stated that there was no nuclear weapons co-operation with any nation. 46. The decision to renounce nuclear weapons seems to have been taken because South Africa felt less threatened with the end of the Cold War and a decline in regional tensions while signing the NPT would be advantageous for the development of South Africa's civil nuclear programme. Namibia, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have all signed the NPT since 1991. b. Latin America 47. Argentina and Brazil, which used to be among the "threshold" countries, have both formally renounced their military nuclear programmes. The renunciation is mentioned both in the 1989 Brazilian Constitution and in the November 1990 Foz do Iguazu declaration. The two countries have undertaken to implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which creates a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, and to conduct mutual inspections of their nuclear facilities. To this end they signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in December 1991. These commitments place the two states under obligations similar to those imposed by the NPT, but neither is planning to accede to the NPT, which they consider discriminatory. They also retain the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons, given the scale of their civil nuclear programmes and their knowledge of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Cuba, which is not a party to the NPT, is however contemplating signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. B. Supply 1. China 48. China is often cited as a nation guilty of encouraging nuclear proliferation. Both the military nuclear programmes of Argentina and Brazil, for instance, are believed to have benefited from Chinese technology during the 1980s. Since 1984, however, China has said on several occasions that it will respect the principles of nuclear non-proliferation. This has included the adoption of a stricter export policy which demands that the items transferred be subject to IAEA safeguards and used for peaceful purposes. China's accession to the NPT in March 1992 confirmed the new direction of its policy. It should be pointed out, however, that Article III of the NPT concerning safeguards does not cover transfers of information, a source of some concern. This is particularly the case with some of China's possible customers in the Middle East and southern Asia. 49. Although in recent years China has made substantial sales to Iran, India and Pakistan, sales have been made on the condition of IAEA safeguards. 2. The Former Soviet Union 50. The former Soviet Union had extensive trade in nuclear technologies and materials with many, mainly like-minded nations but such trade was within the NPT framework. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been great concern about leakage of nuclear material and transfers of expertise. To cite just a few concerns which have received press attention, Turkmenistan is said to have agreed to supply heavy water laboratories and uranium enrichment equipment to Iran; Iran is also rumoured to have acquired one or more tactical nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan and there are persistent reports of nuclear experts being attracted to nations posing proliferation threats. In addition, there have been many relatively small-scale attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of the former Soviet Union and it seems reasonable to assume that at least some attempts have succeeded. (This subject is addressed in more detail in the Report of the Sub-Committee on Technology and the Environment.) 3. South-South Trade 51. Nuclear co-operation is also emerging within the developing world. Thus Pakistani and North Korean experts are helping Iran to extract and process natural uranium from ore. There are also co-operation agreements between Iran and Pakistan which are to lead to the supply of a 300 MW reactor among other things. India, Brazil and Argentina are also conducting a vigorous drive to export to the developing countries. In this way, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt etc. have in recent years obtained nuclear technology that could be used for military applications. 4. Transfers from Western Countries 52. As well as Soviet assistance, most of the proliferating states have received Western assistance to varying degrees. West German transfers, for instance, helped Brazilian and Argentinian advances in sensitive technologies and materials. Similarly, Iran and Pakistan initially received essentially Western, and particularly French, assistance. India and Israel, and even Iraq, received French assistance with the Osirak reactor. More recently, from 1987 to 1990, the United States authorized the sale to Iran of computers and oscilloscopes that could have military applications. 53. The case of Iraq demonstrates that, legally or otherwise, numerous Western companies were exporting sensitive supplies to proliferating states. According to the German intelligence services, some 300 firms from 28 countries, particularly Western ones, were involved in exports to Iraq. German firms were singled out for their assistance for the Iraqi centrifuge programme. II. THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 54. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime rests essentially on a multilateral instrument, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1970. The NPT is supplemented by regional treaties, bilateral agreements and unilateral undertakings by the major countries supplying nuclear technology, materials and equipment. In recent years, these various elements have been adapted to tighten the regime. A. The Traditional Regime 1. The Legal Basis For Non-Proliferation a. The NPT 55. Under the NPT, nuclear weapons states undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and not to facilitate their manufacture or acquisition by non-nuclear weapons states. The latter undertake not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and not to receive any assistance in this field. 56. These bans, which establish a clear division between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapons states, are accompanied by counterweights. Firstly, Article IV of the Treaty enshrines the inalienable right of all parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Secondly, under Article VI, the nuclear weapons states undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith" to halt the nuclear arms race with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament. 57. There are currently 156 parties to the NPT. Several non-nuclear weapons states have signed the NPT in recent years but perhaps the most important recent development has been the accession, in 1992, of China and France. These two countries had not been legally bound by the prohibitions and conditions in the Treaty relating to nuclear transfers. France had previously undertaken to comply with the principles of non-proliferation and indeed, since the mid-1970s, pursued an even stricter policy than that recommended by the "London Club" (discussed below) of nuclear suppliers, of which it is a member. Politically, however, its accession is an important step towards universal adoption of the Treaty. Regarding the practical consequences for non-proliferation, China's signature is even more important in that China's transfers are not covered by the London guidelines, although, as noted earlier, China has been pursuing a more restrictive export policy for some years now. 58. The NPT is reinforced by several regional multilateral instruments, in particular the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) - whose purpose is to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America by prohibiting the testing, manufacture, acquisition or acceptance of such weapons there - or the Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) which applies similar provisions to the South Pacific. These regional accords are sometimes supplemented by bilateral undertakings permitting implementation of confidence-building measures (particularly in cases where there is hesitation about the regional and/or multilateral approach), and thereby ultimately fostering non-proliferation. b. Monitoring of Application of the NPT 59. Article III of the NPT commits parties to accept safeguards on their own use of nuclear material and on transfers of such materials under IAEA auspices. Non-nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty have to conclude with the Agency a safeguards agreement designed to reveal any diversion of such products from civil programmes for military purposes. Parties to the Treaty also undertake not to export to non-nuclear weapons states such products or materials, or equipment or materials intended for the processing, use or production of special fissile products unless those items are subject to IAEA safeguards. 60. To this end, the IAEA safeguards traditionally include an accounting system to reveal, within a conversion period (i.e. before the State concerned has had time to assemble a nuclear weapon), any diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials; a sensitive material containment system to limit the possibility of access; and a monitoring system, comprising cameras, radiation detectors and closed-circuit television, capable of detecting illegal traffic in materials, equipment or technologies. 61. The mechanism is geared to controlling fissile materials. Nuclear installations themselves are not subject to controls, nor are the research centres where enrichment and reprocessing methods are developed without the use of nuclear materials. The IAEA depends on the information supplied by the monitored state regarding the presence of such materials. In the past, the Agency has not been authorized to act on information obtained from other sources. 62. Recent experience has revealed the system's shortcomings and has shown that other sources of information are essential to verify the existence and nature of the nuclear activities of the states subject to safeguards. The limitations of the system actually stem from its original concept: it was not envisaged that IAEA controls, originally designed to detect diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes, should be able to reveal an entire clandestine programme that, like Iraq's, was not based on diversion of materials under safeguards. The discovery of the Iraqi programme modified perceptions of what safeguards should achieve. Now the Agency is expected to be able to certify the absence of undeclared installations in states that have agreed to comprehensive supervision of their nuclear activities. 2. Restrictions Imposed by the Traditional Suppliers 63. The international non-proliferation regime, also depends on the restrictive provisions adopted by the exporters' organizations, particularly where the Treaty does not itself exclude the transfer of facilities likely to aid the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials. 64. At the start of the 1970s, the Zangger Committee brought together several exporters from the Eastern and Western blocs as well as Japan, Sweden, Austria, Finland, and Ireland to produce a list of sensitive materials and equipment which would be subject to special restrictions and consultation among suppliers. The Committee also helped to develop safeguards standards. The Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 led exporters to hold further consultations. Meeting as the "London Club" from 1975 to 1977, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, subsequently joined by other countries, drew up tighter guidelines and restrictions on transfers of nuclear items. These included an agreement to insist on safeguards on technology so that, for instance, a copy made of a safeguarded reactor would also have to be placed under safeguards. It also specified a list of sensitive materials; protection of the supplies transferred against theft; a uranium enrichment ceiling of 20 per cent of export of enrichment or reprocessing installations, etc.. B. Recent Trends 1. Improvement of Controls and Transparency 65. The regime's shortcomings have led to many calls to strengthen the IAEA's control methods to enable it to combat proliferation more effectively. To this end, the IAEA has been re-appraising its safeguards to see how they could be enhanced. This work has been in progress since the mid-1980s prompted by growing concern about activities in Iraq and North Korea. Naturally, the re-appraisal received additional impetus in 1991 when the extent of Iraq's covert military nuclear programme became known. 66. A main area of attention is the IAEA's possible ability to mount special inspections. This raises several questions: - Are new agreements required or do existing agreements provide a basis for special inspections? - What information sources are acceptable as grounds for mounting special inspections? - Who has the right to decide whether a special inspection can take place? - Would a state be able to refuse a special inspection and would a special inspection be restricted only to declared sites or take place at locations suspected of conducting nuclear weapons activities? 67. With respect to the need for new agreements, the IAEA has concluded that nations which have signed full-scope (also known as comprehensive) safeguards agreements with the IAEA can be subject to special inspections. These inspections can take place at locations determined by the IAEA whether or not the inspected state has declared them to the IAEA. Essentially, full-scope safeguards give the IAEA the right to verify all nuclear material in the relevant state and to apply safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities within the state. The inspected state has the right to be consulted but in the final analysis, that state would be obliged to permit an inspection to take place. If the objection is maintained or if inspections are frustrated, the IAEA is able to refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council as has happened with North Korea. 68. As regards information sources, until 1991, the IAEA could only take into account information obtained in the course of its normal safeguards activities. In 1991, however, the IAEA's Board of Governors agreed that the IAEA's Director General should be able to receive and scrutinize all plausible information that may be presented from outside the IAEA. This includes information gathered by national intelligence services. It was also agreed that the Director General should have the right to decide whether such information warranted a special inspection. In addition, the Board decided that if the Director General felt that an inspection was not warranted, the state providing information could present its case directly to the Board of Governors. 69. In an effort to rectify another shortcoming of the safeguards regime, the IAEA has now requested that all nations with full-scope safeguards agreements inform the IAEA without delay of any new nuclear programmes, planned facilities, and modifications to existing ones. This stemmed from Iraq's claim that it had not declared its enrichment centrifuges because no nuclear material had been introduced to them. This exploited a "loophole" in safeguard procedures which ask only that facilities are declared 180 days before nuclear material is introduced to them. This would enable early and more effective control to be exercised since the IAEA can send inspectors to check that the building is in accordance with the plans submitted. 70. The United Nations Security Council has also undertaken to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On 31 January 1992, the Security Council, meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government declared its intention to prevent the spread of technologies which would aid in research into or production of weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council agreed to take the actions necessary to prevent the proliferation of weapons which pose a threat to international peace and security, particularly in the event of violations reported by the IAEA. 71. In an extreme case such as Iraq, referral to the United Nations Security Council could result in the use of inspections backed by force but a more likely option would be the imposition of economic sanctions by United Nations countries.(9) 72. The non-proliferation regime is being further enhanced by developments in regional agreements. Argentina and Brazil have established their own bilateral control system, supplemented by a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and have set up their own control agency, the Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Uruguay and Chile may also join. In 1992 the IAEA also drew up a partnership agreement with Euratom to foster a more rational approach in applying safeguards which both organizations conduct in order to limit needless duplication. 2. Action by the Suppliers 73. An obvious limitation to the IAEA's new interpretation of its rights to conduct special inspections is that they would only apply to nations which had signed a full-scope safeguards agreement and not to those where only specific facilities or materials were under safeguards (10). The London Club of nuclear suppliers has, however, taken steps which should increase the number of nations signing full-scope safeguards agreements. In the past, opposition from France, Germany, and Japan prevented the London Club from insisting that customers must sign a full-scope agreement. As a result, only the relevant items sold were placed under safeguards. 74. Confronted with the new situation after the Gulf War, the group - now numbering 28 (11) - met in 1992 and approved an agreement which defined a list of materials, equipment and sensitive dual-use technologies whose exports to non-nuclear weapons states would be regulated and prohibited if there is an unacceptable risk of use for military purposes. It provides that before transferring this kind of article, suppliers are to receive guarantees concerning end-use, destination and their non-use for explosive purposes or in uncontrolled nuclear activities. Furthermore, in accordance with the recommendation to suppliers at the fourth NPT review conference in 1990, the London Club now requires that any non-nuclear weapons customer must sign a full-scope safeguards agreement. As early as 1978 the United States imposed this condition followed by Australia and Canada. In recent years other major suppliers - the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990, then France, the United Kingdom, the other members of the European Community, and Russia - have adopted this principle for their future contracts and for renewal of existing agreements. 75. The major issue for the London Club is now to persuade the new suppliers (China, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, etc) to follow its recommendations. Progress has been made with Argentina which in 1992 adopted a special regulation on sensitive exports and particularly nuclear materials, equipment and technology liable to have military applications. Argentina requires that they be used for peaceful purposes and that full-scope safeguards be applied and it reserves the right to apply these criteria to technical assistance and to some non-nuclear dual-use supplies. III. THE NPT EXTENSION CONFERENCE IN 1995 76. In 1995 the Non-Proliferation Treaty Renewal Conference will take place in accordance with Article X of the Treaty. This Article stipulates that a conference is to be convened 25 years after the Treaty's entry into force to decide, by a majority, whether the NPT shall continue in force "indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods". In all likelihood, the 151 non-nuclear weapons states and the five nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty will agree to its extension. Until recently, however, that outcome seemed less likely. 77. The 1990 review conference failed to agree on a final document intended to prepare the way for the conference on extension primarily because non-nuclear weapons nations felt that the nuclear weapons nations and the nuclear supplier nations were not adequately fulfilling their obligations under Articles IV and VI of the NPT. Article IV includes a provision to give consideration to the developing world in the use of civil nuclear energy and Article VI is an undertaking "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". Obligations under Article IV are still likely to be an issue of some contention but the situation regarding Article VI has changed very dramatically since 1990. Major progress has been made with the withdrawal of nuclear artillery and tactical missiles from Eastern and Western Europe, the dismantling of intermediate-range nuclear forces and agreement to greatly reduce strategic weapons. Although nuclear arsenals remain substantial, there can be no doubt that the trend nowadays is towards reductions in nuclear stockpiles. 78. Another major complaint at NPT review conferences in the past has been the failure of the declared nuclear weapons nations to produce a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. This issue has received a great deal of attention in recent months and is worth examining in some detail. A. Nuclear Testing 79. The non-nuclear weapons nations see a ban on nuclear testing as one of the key yardsticks for determining whether the nuclear weapons nations are actually fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Indeed, in 1990, one of the main reasons why the NPT review conference failed to produce a final agreed statement was that the non-nuclear nations, led by Mexico, insisted on a call for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. 80. As the 1995 NPT renewal conference approaches - and as concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases - more attention is being paid to the impact of a ban on nuclear tests. A commitment to such a ban would certainly improve the likelihood of attaining an indefinite extension of the NPT. 81. A complete ban on testing nuclear weapons has been on the international agenda since the mid-1950s but the many attempts to achieve this goal have so far failed. Even though a complete ban has not been achieved, however, treaties have been agreed which place restrictions on nuclear tests, such as a ban on atmospheric tests to limit radioactive contamination. 82. At present, three of the five declared nuclear weapons states - France, Russia and the United States - have moratoria on nuclear weapons tests. The other two nuclear weapons states - China and the United Kingdom - have rather different positions China has not tested a nuclear weapon since 25 September 1992 but has not declared a moratorium. The United Kingdom - which does not want a test ban yet - cannot conduct tests because it uses the American test site in Nevada. 1. Test Ban History 83. At the outset of negotiations on a CTBT, the key purposes of a test ban were clearly identified. A test ban was seen as a method of placing a limit on nuclear weapons technology. New designs must be tested before being incorporated into an arsenal so a test ban would limit the ability of the nuclear weapons states to develop more advanced weapons and it would also make it more difficult for aspiring nuclear weapons states to develop their own nuclear weapons. 84. Another consideration was growing concern about the global radioactive contamination from nuclear tests which were conducted above ground. 85. From 1959 to 1961, all the nuclear weapons powers - then only the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States - observed a moratorium on nuclear testing. Negotiations took place on a variety of nuclear disarmament measures including the production of fissile material and nuclear warheads. Although these negotiations did not result in any agreements, in 1963 the nuclear weapons nations did agree to the Partial Test Ban Treaty which stipulated that no nuclear weapons testing would take place in outer space, in the atmosphere or underwater or in any other environment which would distribute radioactive debris outside territorial limits. This limited nuclear testing to underground locations and bound the parties to prevent any radioactive material vented from test-sites crossing their national borders. 86. By the mid-1960s, the notion of an East-West agreement on both conventional and nuclear disarmament gave way to the idea of negotiating successive arms control and disarmament measures, starting with a nuclear non- dissemination/proliferation agreement which, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was signed in 1968. 87. In 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and, in 1976, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). The TTBT limited underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons and the PNET placed restrictions on the testing of nuclear explosives which might be used for peaceful purposes. These treaty restrictions also apply to British tests since the United Kingdom has tested its nuclear weapons at the American test site in Nevada in 1962 and has no other test sites. 88. Negotiations on a CTBT resumed between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1977 but were suspended in 1981 as East-West relations deteriorated. 89. Nuclear testing did not disappear from the international agenda, however. In 1982, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva created an ad hoc committee on verification and compliance of a comprehensive test ban although the mandate did not include negotiation of a test ban. Disputes over mandates prevented meetings from 1983 but the committee began meeting again in 1990. 90. The Soviet Union had a testing moratorium between 1985 and 1986. The Soviet Union and the United States also held talks on improving the TTBT and the PNET in 1987. There seemed to be little prospect, however, of a comprehensive test ban until relatively recently when the end of the Cold War brought about a re-appraisal of many aspects of arms control including nuclear weapons testing. 2. Policies on Nuclear Testing a. Russia 91. In October 1991, the president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, announced a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing and this has been extended by Russia's President Boris Yeltsin. The last nuclear test was on 25 October 1990 at Novaya Zemlya, an island in the Arctic. The Soviet Union's other test site at Semipalatinsk now lies in Kazakhstan so if Russia resumes testing, the Arctic site will have to be used, a situation causing great concern to the Nordic nations already anxious about past tests and nuclear dumping in and around the island. 92. Some factions within the military and scientific communities are opposed to a complete test ban, but official policy - backed by the parliament - is to press for a global ban on nuclear testing. A ban is seen as a key method of curbing nuclear proliferation and discouraging Ukraine in particular from acquiring nuclear weapons status. Officials say that in any event no tests will take place before 1995. b. The United States 93. In August 1992, the Senate voted for the first time to halt nuclear testing suspending all tests for a period of nine months beginning 1 October and ending 1 July 1993. Thereafter, the new legislation permitted no more than five tests per year for the following three years but only to test and improve safety and reliability. (Three of the permitted tests were for the British test programme). It required the United States to negotiate a CTBT and to stop all nuclear tests by September 1996, unless other states began testing again. In addition, before the resumption of nuclear tests, the legislation required the president to submit a report to Congress explaining the reasons for the resumption. 94. In July 1993, President Clinton extended the Moratorium until September 1994 "as long as no other nation tests" and called upon other nations to impose similar moratoria. He will seek to negotiate a permanent international test ban. Funding will be provided to develop new techniques for checking the reliability of weapons without actual nuclear tests and President Clinton ordered the weapons laboratories to stand ready to resume testing if needed. Moreover, the United States is preparing a new arms-control proposal that would aim for a worldwide ban on the production of materials used to produce nuclear weapons. Under the plan all nations would be asked to join an international agreement to stop producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium unless facilities are under international inspection. Furthermore, countries such as India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Africa would be discouraged from any production of these materials. 95. The debate about a complete test ban is most vigorous in the United States. Opponents to a ban in Congress, the military, and the weapons laboratories have argued that testing remains vital to guarantee the reliability of stockpiles and to test safety enhancements. It is also argued that tests with very low yields are a viable alternative to a complete test ban. President Clinton acknowledged that a moratorium does pose problems but expressed the view that these problems are outweighed by the moratorium's contribution to achieving a global test ban and achieving progress in limiting nuclear proliferation. c. The United Kingdom 96. On 3 February 1992, the United Kingdom's Prime Minister, John Major stated Britain's position on testing, declaring that for as long as it was necessary for the country to have nuclear weapons, it required the ability to test them. The government believes that testing is necessary from time to time in order to ensure an effective and safe deterrent. The United Kingdom's position is that a test ban will not stop proliferation. South Africa, for example, developed nuclear weapons without testing them and Iraq came close to achieving a nuclear capability without testing. 97. Both major opposition parties in the United Kingdom support the signing of a comprehensive test ban treaty in the near future and the government, while not supporting a test ban at this stage, has not strongly reacted to the American moratorium which affects planned British tests. Indeed, the British position is that it can "live with" the American moratorium as long at it receives help with computer simulation techniques to replace actual weapons tests. d. France 98. In April 1992, the French government announced a moratorium on nuclear testing and President Mitterrand extended this in July 1993. He called for all other nuclear weapons powers to suspend testing and produce a test ban treaty that is global and verifiable. 99. Despite some opposition from within the centre-right coalition government and concerns about the development of nuclear warheads for two types of submarine-launched missiles, the French Prime Minister, Eduoard Balladur has supported the moratorium. A commission of scientific and military experts has been appointed to ensure that France's nuclear deterrent does not suffer as a result of the suspension of nuclear tests. e. China 100. China has not declared a test moratorium but has not conducted any nuclear weapons tests since September 1992. In 1990, China participated in the Conference on Disarmament's ad hoc committee for the first time and said in 1991 that it would consider a test ban if the United States and the Soviet Union reduced their nuclear weapons by 50 per cent. In fact, subsequent strategic arms control agreements between the United States and Russia go beyond this figure but no further statement has yet been forthcoming from China. 101. In May 1992, China tested a one-megaton nuclear weapon - its largest ever - and stated three months later that this test symbolized that China's "nuclear technology had reached the late 1980s technical competence of the United States and the Soviet Union". Although clear policy statements on nuclear testing have not been forthcoming China has said that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor will it export them. China has declared its willingness to discuss relevant issues with all the members of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. 3. Negotiating a Test Ban 102. It is clear that the chances of obtaining a comprehensive nuclear test ban are better than ever but the route to a ban is by no means a clear one. A complete ban might be achieved without any further testing or it might be phased in following a period of fewer and perhaps smaller tests. Certainly, there is a good case for testing to guarantee safety and reliability as well as to validate designs for new systems such as those approaching completion by France and the United Kingdom. There is, however, technical disagreement about whether testing is essential for these goals to be achieved or whether non-nuclear tests and simulation will suffice. 103. As well as establishing the timetable for producing a complete test ban and whether it should be phased in or not, negotiators will have to establish adequate verification provisions. Test ban verification is a technically complex area. Verifying a test ban between co-operative partners can certainly be done reliably but parties who choose not to co-operate can make efforts to conceal nuclear tests. Testing of low-yield nuclear devices might be done in large underground chambers in certain geological formations so that detectors would produce ambiguous indications. 104. This raises the question of what additional provisions should be made to ensure that aspiring nuclear weapons nations cannot conduct covert nuclear weapons tests. One possibility might be a United Nations convention whereby nations would declare their willingness to have sensors such as seismometers placed on their soil if requested by the IAEA. This would reduce the scope for conducting covert nuclear tests. 105. Certainly, a comprehensive test ban will not actually prevent new nations from joining the nuclear weapons club. Rudimentary nuclear weapons can be produced with a high degree of confidence that they will work without testing. After all, the first nuclear weapon used operationally - the Little Boy dropped on Hiroshima - was of a design which had not been tested. (The design successfully tested beforehand was like that of the Fat Man used on Nagasaki). 106. That said, there can be no doubt that a comprehensive test ban treaty adhered to by the declared nuclear weapons states would greatly increase the likelihood that the NPT renewal conference will succeed in achieving an indefinite extension of the NPT. B. The Outlook for 1995 107. The progress made in nuclear disarmament since the 1990 NPT review conference provides some grounds for optimism regarding the outcome of the 1995 renewal conference and progress on a test ban would provide even more. Furthermore, if the declared nuclear weapons states could point to such substantial progress in nuclear disarmament, they would be better placed to press other nations to extend their obligations under the NPT indefinitely and to seek additional commitments regarding verification of the NPT and, perhaps, the emplacement of sensors to verify the absence of covert nuclear weapons testing. 108. Even so, it is possible that the 1995 renewal conference could founder because of efforts to amend the Treaty. One amendment might be aimed at introducing a comprehensive test ban if that has not emerged by 1995 but many others might be envisaged relating, for instance, to verification, firmer commitments on nuclear arms control, no-first use obligations, or more specific aid to the developing world. Amendments would be very difficult to agree upon and would not be aided by the complex and cumbersome amendment procedure. (12) 109. If the Treaty is extended either indefinitely or for fixed periods, there would be no need for ratification by the parliaments of the parties since the provision on extension - like the rest of the NPT has already been ratified. IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 110. It is possible to see that there is a consensus on the need to strengthen measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Past mistakes are well recognized. Among the mistakes must be counted the "blind eyes" turned to Iraq during its conflict with Iran and to Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The situation in Iraq and North Korea combined with revelations about South Africa's nuclear weapons programme have ensured that the building of a dependable non-proliferation regime has become an arms control priority. 111. One of the main threats to the Non-Proliferation regime is North Korea and no effort should be spared to persuade North Korea, to reverse its decision to withdraw from the NPT rather than merely suspend that decision. Furthermore, the international community should reject any resolution to this problem which does not permit satisfactory inspections to the suspect sites in North Korea. 112. The NPT lies at the heart of efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and it should be extended indefinitely as it stands to avoid a possible impasse which might well be caused by amendments. The NPT is not perfect but the better might be the enemy of the good. Instead of seeking amendments to deal with any perceived shortcomings, it would be simpler and safer to consider additional protocols and regional or bilateral agreements. 113. Clearly, progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would improve the likelihood of attaining an indefinite extension of the NPT. That is not to say that all testing must be banned by 1995 but that a clearly agreed timetable for banning all nuclear tests should be in place by the time of the NPT renewal conference. 114. As regards IAEA safeguards and their implementation, new initiatives must be encouraged to attain further and more extensive agreement on verification. Despite the progress made in strengthening safeguards, particularly regarding special inspections, these only apply to nations with full-scope safeguards agreements. They do not amount to true "challenge inspections". Nations must be persuaded to accept a certain number of challenge inspections each year. These might be initiated by any party without the need for approval by the IAEA. A useful model for challenge inspections is provided in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which was signed by over 120 nations in Paris in January 1993 (13). The challenge inspection procedures of the CWC were worked out to balance the sometimes conflicting requirement of adequate verification and the need to preserve legitimate and unrelated commercial or military secrecy. Trial inspections in preparation for implementation of the CWC seem to have worked well. 115. It is worth reiterating that the London Suppliers Club consisting of 28 nations, known formally as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, has agreed that all sales to non-nuclear weapons states can only be made to nations which have signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Thus, the customer nation becomes liable to IAEA special inspections. This is a welcome development but does not bind emerging nuclear suppliers such as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil etc. and other more established suppliers such as China and the former Soviet republics (except Russia) that are not members of the Group. Clearly, these nations should be persuaded to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to participate in joint monitoring and assessment of nuclear purchases and insist upon the existence of an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement as a condition of nuclear sales. 116. Another possible improvement in safeguards procedures could be to decrease the "significant quantity" of fissile material diversions that safeguards should be able to detect. At present, the significant quantities are eight kilograms for plutonium and 25 kilograms for uranium enriched to 20 per cent or more. These quantities were laid down in 1967 but it is now possible to build nuclear weapons using smaller amounts, as little as four kilograms of plutonium. Reducing the significant quantity would mean more inspections and would require modification of the safeguards procedure but it would reduce the likelihood of diversion to military uses. There may also be some scope for providing assistance in areas such as legislation and customs controls in nations which are emerging as nuclear suppliers. 117. Certainly, the IAEA has begun to respond very constructively to the need to enhance its safeguards regime. The nuclear suppliers are to be commended for their efforts (in some cases belated) to place a higher priority on international security than on commercial gain. 118. For the IAEA to be effective, however, it must have the resources to fulfil more burdensome safeguards obligations. Stagnation of the IAEA's budget has made it difficult to cope with the normal expansion of its activities, let alone its new responsibilities in Latin America, South Africa and the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's inability to pay its contribution in 1991 further exacerbated this financial constraint. (The Soviet Union used to contribute over 10 per cent of the Agency's budget.) Obviously, if nations demand more of the Agency, they must foot the bill. In 1992, the IAEA's safeguards budget was about $68 million, a relatively modest sum (14). If the international community wants tighter safeguards, nations should view an increased safeguards budget sympathetically. 119. It should also be possible to achieve some cost reductions in safeguards. If nations, unilaterally or multilaterally, agree to be more transparent, cost would come down. They could, for instance, send the Agency early and full information on their nuclear programmes and planned facilities and provide prior authorization for special inspections. To maximize the effectiveness of safeguards, there needs to be more efficient "targeting" and a better use of resources. It is absurd that the IAEA and Euratom both have round-the-clock inspection at a certain German plant and that IAEA inspectors spend five weeks or more per year at each of Canada's reactors while reactors in Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya are inspected only once or twice per year (15). 120. As discussed earlier in this Report, the United States has announced that it is preparing a new arms-control proposal intended to produce a global ban on the production of materials used to produce nuclear weapons. This would entail an international agreement to discourage the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium and ensure that any facilities are under international inspection. Any such proposal merits international support. 121. As the 1995 NPT renewal conference approaches, the international community must become more open to measures which will limit any opportunity for nuclear proliferation. 122. Finally, it is surely time to consider entirely new thinking in our approach, not just ridding the world of the nuclear threat but in bringing about the total reduction to zero of all nationally held nuclear weapons. It becomes interesting to ponder not just the next steps in the road to nuclear disarmament but also the ultimate destination. It is obvious that global security has undergone and continues to undergo a fundamental change. The demise of East-West confrontation has removed the threat of global annihilation and led to unprecedented cuts in nuclear forces. Indeed, it is now possible to envisage a time when the only nuclear threat would come from a "rogue" nation which had covertly acquired or developed nuclear weapons. Because of that threat, it would be impossible to eliminate all nuclear weapons. However, the arsenal required to deter such blackmail need not be large. Now is the time to start considering just how large or small it should be and how it could be controlled. 123. Maintaining a nuclear deterrent is not cheap. And, particularly if such forces are submarine based to ensure maximum survivability, there must be sufficient to ensure that a deterrent remains in place while other parts of the deterrent force are being refitted or maintained. If nuclear forces were pooled, however, it would be possible to make reductions beyond those possible attainable with separate nuclear deterrents. Such an arrangement could not happen overnight or even in one step but by co-ordinating operations bilaterally and then multilaterally, simple economic factors could help a movement towards a common deterrent. 124. All this remains conjecture. It would be premature to speculate too much on the control and possible use of a nuclear force which would be bound to fall under some type of international control. Various forms of co-ordination can be imagined, perhaps most obviously between France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia. The eventual authority responsible for a deterrent against rogue regimes might be the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council or some other body created specifically for that purpose. But whatever the eventual details, thought should be given to how the world could reduce nuclear weapons arsenals to a minimum, residual level. 125. Now is the time for constructive thought. The time is ripe for the development of new ideas and initiatives. This is the task before us. Footnotes: ---------- (1) The Rapporteur would like to express his gratitude to Pascale Beauchamp and Vincenza Tutino for their assistance in preparing this Report. (2) Horizontal proliferation is an increase in the number of States with nuclear weapons. Vertical proliferation is an increase in the arsenals of those nations already processing. (3) This includes nuclear, chemical weapon and ballistic missile stockpiles, equipment and facilities. (4) "CIA Draft Says Iran Near Nuclear Status", International Herald tribune, 1 December 1992. (5) David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "India's Silent Bomb", The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. (6) "Pakistan Able to Build Bomb", Jane Defence Weekly, 15 February 1992, p.213. (7) The NPT permits withdrawal at three months notice if a party feels that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interest. The party is supposed to make a statement to the United Nations Security Council stating its case. North Korea based its withdrawal from the NPT on the military exercise Team Spirit 93, involving Americans and South Koreans, and on "the unjustified actions of certain officials of the IAEA Secretariat" relating to the Agency's ultimatum. (8) For more detail on nuclear weapons in the Former Soviet Union, see the 1992 Report of the Sub-Committee on Verification and Technology and the 1993 Draft Autumn Report of the Sub- Committee on Technology and the Environment. (9) Should the Security Council be unable to agree on sanctions - as in the North Korean case where China has declared its opposition to sanctions - individual nations could choose to act on an ad hoc basis. The United States, for instance, is required under legislation known as the Pressler Amendment to suspend military and financial assistance to a country when the President of the United States cannot certify to Congress the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. This provision has applied to Pakistan since 1990. (10) Over 150 nations have signed the NPT but only about 40 full- scope safeguards agreements within the IAEA. (11) The members are Australia, Austria, belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (12) An amendment conference is convened if requested by one- third of the parties. Any amendment must be approved by a majority of parties, including all five declared nuclear-weapon states and the parties represented on the IAEA Board of Governors at the time. To come into force, the amendment must be ratified by the majority, including all the nuclear-weapon states and the parties represented on the Board of Governors. (13) The Chemical Weapons Convention was examined in the 1992 Draft General Report of the Scientific and Technical Committee. (14) David Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawerence Scheinman and George Bunn, A New Nuclear triad: the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International Verification and the international Atomic Energy Agency, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, September 1992, p.33 (15) Fischer et al. ibid. p.33.