ld countries which possess ballistic missiles. By the year 2000, the number could rise to over 24. Of these, 15 or more may be able by then to produce ballistic missiles independently. Furthermore, at least three may have missiles with intercontinental ranges by the year 2000. 8. In view of the nations with ballistic missile programmes - North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran and Iraq - it is not surprising that the international community is concerned. Table 1 lists those nations with ballistic missile programmes. B. How They Are Acquired 9. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the largest exporter of military hardware in the developing world. Moreover, China has demonstrated a willingness to sell arms to virtually every and any country that places an order, so long as it can pay in hard currency. As large sales of weapons to nations such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya clearly indicate, even "pariah" states are viewed as acceptable customers. This "liberal" arms-trade policy also covers the sale of ballistic missile equipment and technology. To cite just a few examples, in 1988, China sold several intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Saudi Arabia; in mid-1990, it was revealed that China had exported lithium hydrate (which can be used in the production of nerve gas, missile fuel, and nuclear weapons) to Iraq and Libya; in 1991, China allegedly sold a large number of M-9 surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) to Syria and trade in missile components has taken place with Pakistan, a matter discussed later in this Report. The fact that many of these and other sales violate international agreements (such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, which the Chinese have pledged to abide by) or disregard United Nations embargoes seems to have little effect on China's choice of customers. 10. China has also provided technical assistance, especially to previous or potential customers. For example, in April 1991 there were reports that China was advising Algeria and Iran on how to combine nuclear weapanies to avoid export controls. Thus, the routes and methods used to transfer ballistic missiles are usually well disguised and extremely difficult to uncover, and the transfer of smaller missile components and technical data is essentially undetectable. Therefore, since verifying ballistic missile and missile component transfers is so difficult, the effective enforcement of export controls under the MTCR poses difficulties. 26. Another problem is that much of the missile hardware and technology that is used for peaceful, civilian purposes can be converted to military use. India, for example, used the same first stage on its "Agni" IRBM as it did on its Space Launch Vehicle (SLV). Also, trying to determine in every case whether or not a nation intends to adapt "peaceful" technology to an offensive missile programme is highly problematic. 27. Finally, the MTCR is not subscribed to by all the potential suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technologies. 28. Essentially, the MTCR can delay thes; if the missiles cease to have military or political value, then the incentive to acquire them will also cease. 45. Of course, the decision whether or not to deploy a GPS will be enormously complicated. In the first place, there will no doubt be many technical options for a GPS, each with specific capabilities (or combinations of capabilities) and costs. During this time of military cutbacks throughout the Alliance, support for a new multi-billion dollar defence project could be hard to find. Furthermore, deciding how to share the costs among the participating nations is likely to be difficult and formulating an acceptable structure for command-and-control would also be a formidable task. 46. The nuclear forces of countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and China must also be taken into account when considering the deployment of GPS. Obviously these countries do not want their nuclear deterrents to be rendered impotent. 47. Finally, deploying GPS would require a major overhaul of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. A re-working of the ABM Treaty would necessitate a great deal of negotiating and would undoubtedly generate great controversy although, since Russia and the United States have agreed to explore the GPS, this undertaking is clearly a politically viable possibility. 48. Decisions on missile defence by the Clinton Administration have shifted the focus of American work much more squarely on theatre defences. Although space-based sensors are still on the agenda, space-based interceptors have been removed apart from essentially laboratory-scale work. The Strategic Defence Organization (SDIO) has been re-named the Ballistic Missile Defence Organization (BDMO) to reflect this change in emphasis. At present, funding levels remain unchanged for 1994 but this is under review for subsequent years. It is not yet clear how the change in emphasis on missile defences will affect GPS. 49. In view of the growing threat of ballistic missile proliferation, it is not surprising that many nations are now investigating ways of defending themselves or their armed forces in the field from ballistic missiles. Indeed, it would be irresponsible to ignore missile defences. V. CONCLUSION 50. Missile proliferation presents a clear long-term threat to security and stability. If only some of the reports concerning missile technology and hardware acquisition in the developing world are fully accurate, there are still substantial grounds for concern, particularly since several nations seem intent on acquiring nuclear and chemical weapons with which to arm ballistic missiles. 51. Missile proliferation is cause for a fundamental rethinking of Western, and in particular American, military strategies for regional conflicts. During the Gulf War, Iraq used Scud missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia. Militarily, the generally inaccurate Scuds had limited value. As an agent of fear, however, the missiles had a significant impact. It will not be long before other countries are able to use far