-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY - POLITICAL COMMITTEE - SUB-COMMITTE SOUTHERN REG. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE SOUTHERN REGION Draft Interim Report Mr. Miguel HERRERO (Spain) Rapporteur* International Secretariat October 1993 * Until this document has been approved by the Political Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. (*) No Maps included in the ASCII Version. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii INTRODUCTION 1 I. FROM FLANK TO FLASHPOINT 1 II. THE THREAT 2 III. THE ANSWER OF THE ALLIANCE: NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 6 IV. NATO AS A MODEL OF CO-OPERATION 10 ANNEX 12 NOTES 20 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Mediterranean Sea has an ambiguous political and strategic status, even though it falls within the scope of Alliance competencies. It should be considered an extension of NATO's Southern Flank, that is, an extension of the European security environment, as well as the starting point of the Persian Gulf and an area of political and strategic consequences in its own right. Communications, resources, and political, demographic and strategic instability are among the attendant risks. Instability due to migration and immigration within and from the region is a short- and medium-term security risk which in the long run can be controlled through international financial aid, with the aim of holding back migratory flows by increasing local standards of living. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has multiplied the power and conflict centres in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, while European arms control policy has created an arms imbalance in the region. Add to this the emergence of new threats or risks, and it becomes apparent that the "security" problem of the Southern Region is multifaceted, and the potential threats to the region - such as conventional and non-conventional weapons proliferation, the social and economic problems in the region and those in Europe resulting from massive emigration from the South, high population rates, and political instability caused by nationalism and fundamentalism that may generate violence and civil war - are not limited to the region itself. For this reason, the Southern Region has become the strategic centre of the Alliance. As observed by SHAPE Chief of Staff General James B. Davis, it is not an extension of the Alliance into the South, but a new emphasis of the Allied attention to the area. As a result, NATO countries are searching for ways to address these new issues. Traditionally, NATO's effectiveness has been based on its homogeneity, its concentration on defence issues, and its limitation of responsibility. The extension of NATO's area of responsibility would thus weaken collective action and hence Alliance effectiveness. Eventually, the WEU and the future European defence identity could take over from NATO in certain regional matters, with the WEU co-ordinating the European allied deployment as well as joint deployment with the United States and other nations. This is all quite theoretical, however, as recent events have demonstrated that the WEU is not entirely prepared for such collective action. A solution could be found in international co-operation beyond the Alliance, as the Treaty allows for consultations on security issues without constraining military co-operation outside Europe. The security linkage between Eastern and Western Europe, established since June 1990, should also be applied to the entire Southern Tier - NATO must look South as well as East. This should also enable NATO to serve at the request of the United Nations Security Council or the CSCE for limited peacekeeping purposes. The same approach would apply to regional political co-operation. This regionalization of responsibilities would take into account historic, economic and strategic factors, while avoiding certain risks which would accompany this "division of labour". The strict division of territory and operations both in- and out-of-area has lost part of its original importance. The Alliance should therefore not be just an instrument to implement the Western security policy in the Southern Tier but also a model to develop the common security of NATO countries, especially those of the Southern Region, and the non-NATO countries of the Southern Tier. A main object of co-operation should thus be the promotion of the strength of the nation-state system in the Southern Region to obtain permanent and stable partners for co-operation. INTRODUCTION 1. The Sub-Committee on the Southern Region was established at the 36th Annual Session in London (1990). The Sub-Committee has thus far travelled to Rome, Naples, Washington, Tampa, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Granada. 2. To assist members in the deliberations as this work proceeds, the Draft Interim Report elaborates the central theses advanced at the Madrid Annual Session (1991) in the hope of soliciting further commentary on this critical issue. The Final Report by this Rapporteur tries to establish a conceptual frame, sufficiently elaborated to incorporate all information gathered to date and detailed in the Annex, which may also include future information obtained by the Sub-Committee. At the same time, it is the purpose of such a conceptual frame to contribute to the political categories of the Alliance. I. FROM FLANK TO FLASHPOINT 3. It is important to explain at the very outset that "Southern Region" is not synonymous with what was previously termed NATO's "Southern Flank". To the contrary, for the purposes of this Report, the Southern Region1 begins where the southern borders of the NATO Treaty area end. In the future, the name of the area here considered and the title of this Report should be the Southern Tier instead of the Southern Region. 4. The geographic boundaries of the area under consideration should extend beyond those normally considered to comprise NATO's Southern Region and Europe, to reach from the Atlantic coast of the Maghreb, across the Southern coast of the Mediterranean to Turkey's eastern and southern borders. Moreover, a complete study should consider risks from Iran, Iraq, and Syria - states traditionally considered part of the Middle East but which potentially pose direct threats to Turkey, as well as indirect risks to other members of the Alliance. So too should we consider challenges and even threats existing in the southern area of the former Soviet Union (see map 1). 5. The Mediterranean Sea is covered by the Alliance area of responsibility but, simultaneously, it shows an ambiguous political and strategic status. 6. The whole area and its maritime core should be considered under three different approaches: - as an extension of NATO's Southern Flank, that is, an extension of the European security environment; - as the starting point of the Persian Gulf; and - as an area of political and strategic consequences in their own right. MAP I - THE SOUTHERN TIER 7. Communications, resources, and political and demographic and strategic instability are the central issues of those three approaches, all of them interconnected. If, during the Cold War days, the Mediterranean basin, inside and outside NATO's area, was relevant for the Alliance as a theatre of Soviet naval deployment and indirect strategy, nowadays the member states of the Alliance acknowledge new challenges arising from the South. II. THE THREAT 8. To illustrate the above, included are maps describing the areas of political conflict, missile technological capacity and potential for massive migratory movements (map 2), as well as a table of ballistic missile technology along the Southern Tier (table 1). 9. Many of these threats have either been dealt with in other NAA reports, mainly by Senator Borderas in the Civilian Affairs Committee, or, because of their characteristics, cannot be discussed here at length, i.e., immigration or proliferation of military technologies. Nevertheless, it is important to underline their interconnection. For instance, in the case of massive flow of migration, it may represent a serious threat to the MAP 2 - POTENTIAL POINTS OF CRISIS stability and security of immigrant-receiving countries. Proof of such assertion can be found in the Albanian case with relation to Italy as well as in the public opinion of the nations involved. Human rights of immigrants, as well as those of immigrant-receiving nations, can be seriously threatened and the ensuing tensions capitalized on by antidemocratic forces. No doubt, even if viewed in terms of security, economic co-operation is the best way to manage this question. However, such economic co-operation should clearly be conditioned upon severe measures of arms control by immigrant-receiving countries. 10. The interconnection factors co-exist with a relative autonomy, at least in terms of time, meaning that even if economic co-operation to development may contribute to holding back migratory flows, it is only effective in the long range, while the immigration pressure is conceived as a short- and medium-range risk to security. TABLE 1 - BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY ALONG THE SOUTHERN TIER Country Type Range Status Launchers Missiles * (km) Egypt Scud B 280 In service 12 >100 Scud 100 600 R&D Iran Nazeat 120 In service ? >100 Scud B 280 In service 4 100 Iraq* Scud B 280 In service ? >360? Fahd 500 R&D Al-Hussein 600 In service 70? <500? Tamuz-1 2000 R&D Israel Lance 120 In service 12 160 Jericho-1 480 In service ? 50? Jericho-2 1450 R&D Shavit 7500 In service ? ? (SLV)** Libya Scud B 280 In service 80 >240 Saudi Arabia CSS-2 2700 In service 12 120 Syria SS-21 120 In service 12 36 Scud B 280 In service 18 54 M-9 600 Negotiating with PRC * Under terms of the UN cease fire agreement, Iraq's stock of tactical ballistic missiles is to be destroyed. Although large numbers have been destroyed, authorities are unsure of the original numbers available. ** SLV = Space Launch Vehicle capable of boosting a satellite (or warhead) into space. Source: Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation", SIPRI Yearbook, 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 11. Risks and threats thus perceived are diffuse and give way to an enlargement of the area of conflict, reaching from the South to the East of the Alliance, from the Maghreb to Central Asia. Yugoslavian and Soviet break-ups have multiplied the power and conflict centres in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Moreover, threats and interests of some of the allies over areas subject until recently to a policy of blocs have been intensified; tensions between the allies have increased and southern challenges and threats are projected to other areas (map 3). 12. Historically, what has been named Southern Region first appeared to the Western Allies as their own territorial depth in front of Soviet aggression and only later as a conflict scenario. MAP 3 - POLITICAL EUROPE Source: NATO's Sixteen Nations, nx 1/93, Special Issue 13. Therefore, during the first years of the Alliance and before the outlining of Maghreb's independence, the North of Africa was considered a redeployment area in case of a possible attack arising from Soviet forces. Such a concept underwent revision at the beginning of the fifties after the Egyptian revolution, Moroccan independence, and the Algerian war. Those changes and the shortages in Western conventional deterrence were at the origin of the thesis of massive nuclear retaliation. Consequently, even if such areas were not covered by the Alliance, geographic limits established in the Washington Treaty did not exclude their use in case of war. 14. During a later phase which took place in the fifties, after the independence of the Maghreb countries and the Middle East revolutionary processes, the southern shore of the Mediterranean became a selected landscape for the Soviet Union's indirect strategy. Three main factors actually describe the threat to the Southern Region: (a)The break-up of the inter-bloc order, characteristic of the Cold War, and the subsequent arousal of new sources of tension: not only the North/South axis but also local conflicts. (b)The displacement of arms imbalance to the Southern Region due to the European arms control policy. (c)The emergence of new threats or, at least, new risks. 15. The "security" problem of the Southern Region is multifaceted, and the potential threats to the region occasioned by geographic proximity may by no means be contained to the region itself: conventional and non-conventional weapons proliferation; the social and economic problems in the region and those in Europe resulting from massive emigration from the South; high population rates; and political instability caused by nationalism and fundamentalism that may generate violence and civil war. III.THE ANSWER OF THE ALLIANCE: NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 16. The Southern Region was first considered an out-of-area question, and such was my first approach in the Interim drafts of this Report. The new approach is the best example of progressive diluting of the distinction between inside and out-of-area problems. 17. Out-of-area challenges for the Alliance are defined as those conflicts which arise beyond those limits established in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty, and which threaten not only the Alliance as a whole but also the vital interests of any of its members in such a way that either the global balance that governs NATO's overall security or those values to which the Alliance is committed may be affected. 18. As the Alliance Strategic Concept recognizes, NATO defence planning must take account of regional consideration and geostrategic differences within the Alliance. Indeed, the Concept explicitly acknowledges that a different array of potential risks must be considered given instability in adjacent areas and the substantial military capabilities of states in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. As a 4 August 1992 AFSOUTH Command Briefing observed: "Apart from the break-up of the Soviet Union and resulting turmoil [which] concern NATO in two ways - spillover into NATO territory and the possibility of undermining NATO's cohesion over support for one or the other of these areas, probably the most important factors now affecting our planning environment are the numerous instabilities adjacent to our region in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa.... To deal with these wider and more uncertain array of concerns, our regional strategy has necessarily broadened. Our strategic objectives are essentially the same: to protect the peace and deter aggression....We must mold these into our crisis management system to enable us to respond rapidly and effectively around our periphery to deter and repel aggression as necessary. NATO's response to the potential threat to Turkey and the Mediterranean during the Gulf War provided good experience and demonstrated our ability to respond to the types of risks and crises which may likely face the Southern Region in future. As part of the larger international community we will also have to work with other organizations to which many or all of our countries belong. NATO remains the preeminent military power, however, and can act independently or serve in a complementary or supportive role in our overall quest for peace and stability as we are now doing in the Adriatic [Operation Maritime Monitor was launched on 16 July 1992 in tandem with the WEU-organized Operation Sharp Vigilance to monitor UN Security Council resolutions 713 and 757 regarding the former Yugoslavia]." The Southern Region, because of the disappearance of threats from the Soviet Union and the emergence of new risks in the South-East of the Mediterranean, has now become the strategic centre of the Alliance. As the SHAPE Chief of Staff General James B. Davis has observed, it is not an extension of the Alliance into the South, but a new emphasis of the Allied attention to the area.2 As a result of the above and the Western need to answer the new challenges, five different positions may be identified as having arisen within NATO. 19. The first approach adopts the liberal attitude to international affairs and considers that a DEFENCE POLICY FOR SUCH QUESTIONS IS SUPERFLUOUS, since the economic, social, and political development of the Third World and the conversion of all countries to open societies are enough to guarantee its pacific behaviour and subsequent reconciliation of current conflicts of interest. This illusory attitude tends to set aside the ambiguous nature of development processes as well as their unwanted effects such as religious fundamentalism, and the obvious troubles in building open societies and the conflictive nature of many inter-state interests - regardless of the democratic nature of these countries. Elimination of major imbalances such as explosive and social situations may, indeed, prevent further conflicts. It goes without saying that turbulence should be pre-empted by timely social, economic, and political policies, but that the military dimension must also be recognized. 20. A second approach is all too conscious of NATO's current inability to face the growth of out-of-area conflicts, and proposes DE JURE EXTENSION OF NATO'S LIMITS ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE 6. But such a proposal disregards the unpopular effects of having 16 different parliaments ratifying fundamental amendments to the Treaty, not to mention the fact that two key countries for power projection out-of-area, France and Spain, do not belong to NATO's integrated military command structure. 21. As a result of the above, a third theory, claiming a more realistic view, supports at least DE FACTO EXTENSION OF NATO'S CAPACITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. To this effect, and assuming the limits established in Article 6 refer to the guarantee established in Article 5, nothing prevents either consultations, which have in any event always taken place, or, consequently, any out-of-area actions agreed among the Allies. The aim would rest on the defence of certain COMMON VALUES, rather than TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY clearly defined and guaranteed. This line of thought suggests appropriate action planning by the NATO integrated military structure - as the North Atlantic Assembly presciently supported at the 1990 London Annual Session in Resolution 224, which called upon NATO governments to ensure that the review of NATO's strategy "encompasses a wide-ranging strategic appraisal of developments which could pose new risks for NATO security including the economic security of its member nations" and instructed SACEUR "to develop appropriate contingency planning". According, for example, to NATO Secretary General Worner in an 11 July 1992 interview with Jane's Defence Weekly: "Without any change in the Washington Treaty, NATO can act beyond its borders if there is agreement of the member nations." 22. Once again, however, this supposedly pragmatic vision overlooks a major point: NATO's effectiveness was based on its homogenous composition, a very concise sectorial activity such as defence, and a limited area of responsibility to which it could address its resources - which were always considered rather insufficient for the task. Extension of NATO's area of responsibility would, consequently, result in a weakening of collective action and hence Alliance effectiveness. As an alternative, the enlargement of its members could imply a loss in homogeneity, a key fact in the maintenance of integration (both de jure or de facto, as in the case of Spain), or else the intense co-operation among its members (France). Suffice it to recall that the United States already foresaw this potential effect of NATO's extended membership in the 1950s, when it rejected the British proposal to merge NATO and SEATO. 23. The fourth tendency believes in obtaining A SUBSTITUTE TO NATO'S INABILITY TO EXTEND ITSELF THROUGH THE WEU AND THE EVENTUAL EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY. 24. Thanks to Article 7 (now 8) of the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, the WEU would become the organization to co-ordinate the European allied deployment and joint deployment with the United States and other nations. Subsequently, as a result of Mr. De Decker's report on behalf of the WEU Political Committee, European Security and the Gulf Crisis (1990), the WEU's Parliamentary Assembly has supported the integration of all deployed European forces. 25. Actual practice has not overcome mere declaration, however, for in both the 1987 and 1990 Gulf crises the WEU remained a mere excuse for reluctant allies, and the main European military deployments, namely British, took place before this organization intervened in a limited way. 26. THE APPROPRIATE SOLUTION should be found in a different dimension: TO SERVE THE ALLIED INTERESTS BEYOND THE ALLIANCE. The main reason is the lack of symmetry among the necessarily limited responsibilities of NATO and the worldwide context in which the security needs of the Allies and challenges to them operate. ARTICLE 6, defining the area for purposes of resisting armed attack under Article 5, DOES NOT APPLY TO ANY OTHER ARTICLE OF THE TREATY. It therefore does not limit potential consultations on security issues or constrain the ability of individual or groups of NATO countries to co-operate militarily outside Europe. Such co-operation could even be negotiated and arranged within the NATO consultative framework under Article 4, which states that "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." 27. At the June 1990 Copenhagen meeting, the NATO foreign ministers declared that "Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe", meaning the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. "The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us." This very same position should apply to the entire Southern Region. 28. It is true, of course, that NATO has no RESPONSIBILITIES for the Southern Region, and it is not politically foreseeable to amend Article 6. But this does not mean that NATO has no INTERESTS in the region, as the opening quotation from the AFSOUTH Command Briefing clearly demonstrates. The unpredictability of the area coupled with the political, economic, and military instruments of the NATO member nations, the particular interests of the United States as the global superpower, and the wide asymmetry between economic Europe and strategic Europe all suggest that the problems of the Southern Region are NOT ONLY EUROPEAN, and of course, of direct concern to all states of Europe, BUT TRULY TRANSATLANTIC. 29. Even assuming that the North Atlantic Treaty will continue to be interpreted as foreclosing Alliance collective military operations outside the Article 6 area, this does not preclude two possibilities for Alliance operations and for operations by member nations. 30. The first option would enable NATO to serve under Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, which provides: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority." The possibility of NATO or WEU operating at the request of the CSCE, in co-operation with any CSCE state, for limited peacekeeping purposes within the CSCE zone, as agreed on 10 July 1992 in Helsinki, must also be considered. The enforcement of UN resolutions undertaken with regard to the former Yugoslavia must also be taken into account, most recently with NATO implementation of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina launched on 12 April 1993, and active preparations for implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. 31. The second would involve co-operative action among the principal interested states to prevent conflicts by political means and, if necessary, to deter and defeat aggression and contain turbulence. Coalitions must exercise multiple means for crisis prevention and management, of course, and not only by military means. 32. In either case, we may witness a regionalization of responsibilities taking into account historic, economic, and strategic factors, e.g., Southern European interests in Africa and US predominance in the Middle East. It is precisely these new coalitions with regional partners that the US Central Command (CENTCOM) is engaged in for the purposes, as then US President Bush outlined on 6 March 1991, of creating "shared security arrangements" as the first of four policy directions comprising, in addition, controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, creating new opportunities for a comprehensive peace, and fostering economic development. In order not to undermine security's global nature, regionalization must avoid the following risks: (a) Allowing or promoting local hegemony. The negative experience of Iran and Iraq should suffice to prevent repetition of similar mistakes with other countries. (b) Distributing tasks in such a way as to eliminate the benefits of joint action (synergy) by great trilateral powers. This would be the case if the United States alone was involved in the Middle East, or if only Europe had a presence in the Western Mediterranean. (c) Differentiating between the US single global interest and purely regional interests of other powers. This would inevitably lead to a selective regionalization of US interests. The same would occur if economic and military responsibilities in security areas were subject to a hypothetical "division of labour". 33. Ideally, these new coalitions should have an overall framework. In this context, the Italo-Spanish initiative for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) could be a positive idea. But it goes without saying that it will not prove possible to simply transplant the CSCE model that has withstood the test of time in Europe and which continues to grow in innovative directions; as the Sub-Committee heard Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa suggest, on 5 May 1992 in Cairo, the CSCM could only follow, and not precede, more intensive sub-sets of regional dialogue throughout the Mediterranean. The CSCE arms control regime, however, could have immediate application, as the Sub-Committee was informed by Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin in Jerusalem on 10 September 1992. These areas could include an early freeze on major conventional weapons and personnel and confidence- and security-building measures, building upon the UN-supervised measures already in place in the region. Arms control is, of course, formally one of the five working groups of the Mideast peace process launched on 31 October 1991 in Madrid; this endeavour should not, however, attempt to concern itself to any extent with naval arms control. 34. The above proves that strict separation between areas and operations inside and out-of-area has lost part of its original importance. Legitimate security interests which the Alliance means to serve may be similarly threatened within the area specified in Article 6 as by processes developed out of such area and whose consequences affect both the core of the area and the global balance. The member states of the Alliance are very conscious of this, as proved by the different approach of Allied powers to the Iran-Iraq war in the early eighties and the military intervention which took place in Iraq during the nineties. IV.NATO AS A MODEL OF CO-OPERATION 35. On the other hand, the Alliance should not be only an instrument to implement the Western security policy in the Southern Region but also a model to develop the common security of NATO countries, especially those of the Southern Flank, and the non-NATO countries of the Southern Region. 36. Political co-operation and consultation, mutual friendship, defensive solidarity, national armies and an integrated command or, at least, operational control by the integrated command on a regional basis, are the main Atlantic patterns that could be useful to promote common security among nations in this area. Even if such an ideal solution cannot be reached, there are questions such as the coactive deterrence of massive migrations which evidently cannot be implemented now by the Allied military forces. However, they might be put into place by the forces of migrant-sending countries with the logistic support and assessment not only of immigrant-receiving states, but also from third countries. Exchange of experiences in this field could prove especially helpful. 37. A principal danger to establishing practicable co-operation throughout the Southern Region derives from the fact that many states cannot truly be described as nation-states with fixed and accepted boundaries, with long traditions as national entities, or with principal allegiance vested in national identity. Radical pan-Arabism or religious fundamentalism by definition are in opposition to the nation-state and present boundaries. 38. A main object of co-operation, therefore, should entail the promotion of the strength of the nation-state system in the Southern Region to obtain permanent and stable partners for co-operation. The experience of some states like Egypt and Morocco point the way for obtaining this stability - through political institutions able to integrate solid body politics conscious of their own identity and with a permanent allegiance to their own state. 39. Moderate nationalism, insofar as it is an important agent of self-identity, modernism, and secularism, and insofar as it is devoid of aspirations towards destabilizing regional hegemony, could be a positive element. Because without moderate nationalism and without nation-states international co-operation is axiomatically rendered impossible. ANNEX The Rapporteur visited NATO on 23 March 1992 to pursue further these themes. He held discussions with HE Mr. Carlos Miranda, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Spanish Delegation; Mr. David Law, Head of the Policy Planning Section in the Political Directorate; and Colonel Klaus Wittmann, then Chief of the Strategic Planning Branch, and Captain Alan Bannister, then at the Strategic Planning Branch, Plans & Policy Division, International Military Staff. The following precis reflects the themes that were discussed in a freewheeling exchange, centred on operationalizing the acknowledgement in the Alliance's Strategic Concept that "The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance" and to which Article 4 of the Washington Treaty can be used for consultations and co-ordination of effort. The key issues raised remain the same over a year later, and thus the following reflections offer a useful perspective for the record. Although a number of options - ranging from NATO as a deterrent itself, to support for regional arms control and security measures, to planning ranging from the threat of migration to large-scale military threats - were discussed, no effort was made to define what a precise "NATO" policy toward the Southern Region should entail. First of all, a recurring theme was the continued necessity for the Alliance in a transitional period. NATO was not, of course, the only organization for conducting risk-assessment and consultations regarding the Southern Region. New concepts such as the CSCM proposal had not made much headway owing to the difficulty, inter alia, of defining appropriate geographic boundaries and the apparent lack of interest among NATO nations with the exception of Spain and Italy. Nevertheless, many organizations and groupings, such as Western Mediterranean Co-operation and Black Sea Co-operation, could be used in a synergistic way. Second, the Southern Region had played a greater role than ever before in the development of the New Strategic Concept. WHAT HAD NOT YET OCCURRED WAS AN AGREED POLITICAL APPROACH TO NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES - accounting for a "major lacuna". Two reasons were cited for this circumstance: (1) the lingering view, albeit not one shared by all Allies, that developments in Northern Africa as well as those elsewhere outside the NATO Treaty area in general were simply not Alliance business; and (2) a lack of sensitivity and awareness as to how the Southern Region may today and in future affect Alliance interests. This consciousness would rapidly accelerate as restrictions on the free movement of people were eroded as the European Union process proceeds. A third prominent theme was that despite the creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and the conduct of various events at civilian and military levels under its aegis, NATO HAD TO LOOK SOUTH AS WELL AS EAST: "we cannot allow an imbalance in strategic perspectives to arise between South and East". The Southern Region, like Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, constituted a complicated strategic continuum and one which risked hosting greater instability in proportion to greater democratization, witness Algeria. There were links, however, among South, East, and West in that excessive military exports - such as weapons sold well below world prices by Russian and other republican authorities - could directly contribute to destabilization. Linked in turn to Muslim emigrants in Western Europe, one could not deny the potential for "an explosive cocktail". Yet a fourth theme was THE NEED TO PROJECT NATO AS A SUPPORTER OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND STABILITY IN THE SOUTHERN REGION. NATO could support the arms control process in the area, orientate missile defence systems against future proliferation threats, and more closely monitor international arms transfers. Going further, NATO could perhaps play the same role in a CSCM as in CSCE, i.e., contributing to peacekeeping in a larger multilateral framework as well as working with non-NATO member states in areas such as civil emergency planning, disaster relief, and peacekeeping and other military tasks. Such concepts, however, had not been formally discussed within the North Atlantic Council. Turning then to the Strategic Concept and the ongoing process of creating a new force structure, budgetary constraints and political reasons buttressed the need for multinational orces, ideally no lower than the corps level to maintain minimal battle effectiveness. This as particularly important among NATO Allies in Southern Europe, but "this battle has not et been won". To the contrary, as forces shrank the temptation also increased to preserve as much of the purely national components. As the Strategic Concept was not predicated on a specific "threat", it was difficult to escribe precisely how the new force structure could be used to deter and defend against ut-of-area challenges by way of precise scenarios. Efforts at so doing could prove ounter-productive or politically unrealistic - e.g., NATO organizing a cordon sanitaire in he Mediterranean against waves of "boat people". Nevertheless, a closer look was being taken at the periphery of NATO, and because potential threats directly against NATO erritory could increase this development itself would defuse the out-of-area debate and take us a step further in conceptual thinking". As one participant concluded: "The strategic centre of the Alliance has drifted to the South. The Mediterranean itself is the only entity that links so many diverse nations, and NATO will be well advised to look at this as a whole given the indivisibility of Alliance membership." It was also pointed out, in particular, that in the Strategic Concept (para. 12) the phrase "The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East" preceded the description of risks - build-up of military power, proliferation, disruption of the flow of vital resources, terrorism and sabotage. This deliberately reflected the broad nature of security: "You cannot deter those with whom you do not co-operate." In looking toward the future, a number of arguments were advanced as to how NATO could shape policy toward the Southern Region. The "global challenges" section of the 29-30 May 1989 NATO Summit Declaration, which committed the Allies to consultation and appropriate co-ordination on worldwide developments "which affect our security", had already marked a major reorientation in the Alliance's concept of the security environment and the risks which could emerge from instability outside the treaty boundaries. The task now is to adjust collective Alliance thinking to the changes which have taken place since then, and to take into account the following: - The distinction between "in-area" and "out-of-area" is becoming increasingly fluid. Although the perimeter of the treaty area remains unchanged, with the exception of a reunited Germany, its significance has waned following the end of the Cold War, increasing global interdependence, and military-technological momentum. - The dividing line between "in-area" and "out-of-area" has consequently moved outward, well beyond Alliance territory. This boundary cannot be demarcated, but can be generally defined to include those regions in which instability can seriously challenge Alliance interests and where common effort to reduce risks and spawn co-operation can be concurrently built. - The spectrum of risks which can emerge from revolutionary processes in the East and South can no longer be divided between the traditional threat of large-scale aggression and "low-intensity conflict"; the risks emanating from both regions are, to the contrary, becoming more uniform in nature, with the central danger confronting the Alliance being that of eruption of local instability into regionalized conflict and generalized chaos. - In addressing this "peripheral zone" NATO must be geared for timely crisis anticipation, prevention, management, and resolution. It was also pointed out that the experience, instruments, and procedures are largely in place to implement a new out-of-area approach: - The increased political dimension of the Alliance enables the establishment of a dialogue with states and structures in the South as well as in the East. Although identical frameworks for both regions are not appropriate, the need to establish a dialogue on security and arms control is the same. - NATO's consultation process regarding regional developments needs overhaul, with forward-looking analysis and anticipation of emerging risks matching the commitments that have flowed from and since the 1989 NATO Summit. - The Strategic Concept must be implemented in the near future. The emphasis on flexible, mobile and multidirectional forces responds to the needs for crisis deterrence and management as well as peacekeeping. Multinationalism should make NATO forces appear less "threatening". - Failure of crisis deterrence must also be built into NATO preparedness, namely contingency capability for defending against larger-scale aggression arising from the periphery. This should include a NATO-wide air defence system against the ballistic missile threat, extendable to other states, as an indispensable complement to international efforts to control arms transfers and proliferation. - The NATO role in the Gulf war provides a precedent for future involvement, despite considerable opposition within the Alliance to formally acknowledging the Gulf experience as such a model. - NATO must operationally overcome an out-of-area syndrome overtaken by events. The prospects for doing so, however, have not necessarily improved and have, rather, been complicated but by no means resolved by the process of attempting to develop a European defence identity. Similar lines of argument were also developed by Mr. David Law during the Rose-Roth Seminar in co-operation with the Spanish Cortes on Mediterranean Security from 1 to 3 February 1993 in Granada (see AK 41 SEM (93) 11). The basis of the new NATO force structure announced at the July 1990 London Summit was agreed at the 29 May 1991 meeting of the Defence Planning Committee. The new structure consists of: (1) reaction forces; (2) main defence forces; and (3) augmentation forces (reserves). With particular reference to reaction forces, the NATO heads of state and government agreed at the 7-8 November 1991 Summit in Rome: "To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons....Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time." The NATO ACE (Allied Command Europe) Reaction Force Planning Staff, based at SHAPE, is responsible for the co-ordination of the Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces and the correlation among the land, sea, and air forces. The ground element, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which is separate from the five corps of NATO's main defence force, will consist of 150,000 troops from 11 nations (the original numbers were planned at between 70,000 and 100,000 forces) divided into two components as illustrated in the accompanying charts. The ARRC will be structured in such a way that it will be able to operate with four divisions at any one time, drawing from a pool of ten divisions provided by all Alliance nations except Canada, Denmark, France, Luxembourg and Norway (the Franco-German Corps will form part of the main defence forces).3 Already, however, the ARRC would provide the forces to implement the Vance-Owen plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina if requested by the UN Security Council. The "immediate" reaction forces will build on the longstanding - since 1960 -brigade-sized ACE Mobile Force as well as the standing naval forces and AMF/Air, albeit with the Naval On Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) now becoming a permanent Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) with the participation of eight nations (Greece, Turkey, Italy, United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Spain [under national command but under NATO operational control] and the Netherlands). On 10 September 1991 the first test of the multinational division centre began during exercise Certain Shield '91, involving 28,400 British, German, Dutch and Belgian troops; computers simulated 160,000 troops engaged in combat, with the scenario of "Gold" attacking "Blue" forces from South to North - deliberately doing away with "Red" adversaries. The ARRC, activated on 2 October 1992 at Bielefield, Germany, under UK Lt. General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie, is not expected to be fully operational before 1995, with planning on the Southern Multinational Division having lagged behind that of Central Multinational Division and only agreed in December 1992 (no new plans have been made for the North, which already is supported by the NATO Composite Force, but the ARRC, according to SHAPE, "will be prepared for employment throughout Allied Command Europe to augment/reinforce local forces in a NATO country whenever necessary"). The reason for this location is that the United Kingdom early on sought to take the lead in providing the First UK Corps as the nucleus, the majority of forces are in or near the Central Region, and nations sought not to convey an aggressive signal should the ARRC have been headquartered in the South; although the primary risk spectrum emanating from the South is recognized by all, the ARRC mission is by definition multidirectional. The operational structure and role of these forces is very flexible. For example, the Central and Southern multinational divisions by no means have their roles confined to the geographic area under which they are categorized. The main concept is to deploy "tailor-made" forces for each contingency, as well as allowing for the possibility of including forces from NATO nations not part of the integrated military structure, particularly Spain. Existing contingency plans for the Southern Region are classified, but certain existing plans will still be relevant for this region, e.g., the defence of the Turkish Straits. Although the main threat is no longer identified as the Soviet armed forces, obviously providing effective defence for strategically important areas will remain relevant as well as supporting new refugees during the spring of 1991 and, again, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. The current AMF response time is put at 72 hours, and that for the main Reaction Forces at 15 days. Decision-time will be critical. How much leeway does SACEUR have in promptly committing forces, and what steps might require approval from capitals,ambassadors, or other levels of political control? According to the communique of the 12-13 December 1991 meeting of the Defence Planning Committee: "We are reviewing our crisis management arrangements to ensure the Alliance is capable of responding appropriately to the future risks and challenges which we may face." On 4 June 1992 the ministers merely stated that "crisis management principles and procedures are being developed in line with the enhanced emphasis placed on crisis management in the Strategy", without elaboration. In fact, this is still an ongoing process. At present SACEUR can only activate on his own initiative headquarters and air defences, but not a single AMF soldier can be employed without political authority from the DPC nations; however, pre-delegating additional forces to SACEUR is unlikely to occur as the previous threat has been replaced by unstable risk situations over which nations will want to maintain control. Related to this is contingency planning for the various risks confronting the Alliance. Planning requires minimal political guidance, but here too nations seem unwilling to approve scenarios. On 11 December 1992, the DPC drew attention to the following: "In our Annual Review of national defence plans for 1993-1997 and beyond, we concluded that the commitment of forces to the Alliance reaction forces is generally satisfactory. We welcomed the establishment of the ACE Reaction Force Planning Staff at SHAPE and the recent activation of the Headquarters of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. However, a number of planned national force reductions will have an effect on the future size and capabilities of main defence forces, and we initiated a review of the implications of changing force levels for the new force structure." Added to this are problems of a more longstanding nature within the Alliance, primarily the continuing lack of standardization of communications and equipment, with more progress having been made on operating procedures, spare parts, and ammunition. General James Davis, SHAPE Chief of Staff, has urged with specific reference to the South4: - new agreements on intelligence exchange and air and space surveillance; - substantial investments in facilities for the reception and sustainment of Reaction Forces; - modernization of air defence assets and the development of a "mature" tactical ballistic missile defence system. Nevertheless, never before has a clear political commitment to multinationality and rapid reaction been achieved, and steps are being taken to attain a very difficult and ambitious undertaking. The real question is whether these sophisticated arrangements will be able to address likely risks, be it preventive deployments, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacebuilding. However, as your Rapporteur discussed with AFSOUTH Deputy Commander-in-Chief, General Antonio Milani and several officers, during a 29 April 1993 visit to Naples, the ARRC will already be called upon if so decided by the UN Security Council and the North Atlantic Council to implement the UN peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina - although the "biggest difficulties", according to a briefing, concerned "forces available" and "time frame", both in the sense of lead times for deployment and preparedness to remain in the region. This would involve a huge challenge: separating parties, monitoring the withdrawal of forces and of heavy weapons, establishing checkpoints, monitoring borders, and carrying out "implied tasks" such as assisting civil authorities to restore infrastructure, mine-clearing, medical aid, and the progressive demilitarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rules of engagement and chain of command in the future operation, moreover, remained contentious. Since 16 July 1992 AFSOUTH had been actively engaged in NATO's first operation in support of UN Security Council resolutions: naval monitoring over the Adriatic in Operation Maritime Monitor and then Maritime Guard, and, since, 12 April 1993, Operation Deny Flight to enforce the no-fly zone which NATO began monitoring on 16 October 1992 in Operation Sky Monitor. SACEUR delegated authority for the implementation of this operation to the AFSOUTH Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Mike Boorda, who is responsible for the overall conduct of the operation. Operational control of day-to-day mission tasking for fighter aircraft is delegated by CINCSOUTH to Commander, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, Lt. General Antonio Rossetti at Vicenza, Italy. Co-ordination between NATO and the United Nations has been arranged through an exchange of representatives between the Commander 5th ATAF and both the UNPROFOR HQ in Zagreb and the UN HQ Bosnia-Herzegovina Command in Kiseljak. The liaison officers facilitate the exchange of information and co-ordination of flight clearance procedures. Aircraft from the E-3A Component of NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) are supporting Deny Flight as well as Maritime Guard and the WEU Operation Sharp Fence from their home base at Geilenkirchen, Germany, and forward operating bases at Aviano and Trapani, Italy, and Preveza, Greece. French E-3F aircraft operate from Avord, France, and Trapani, Italy, under the auspices of the WEU. As of 17 April 1993, 744 sorties had been flown, including 506 fighter missions. In looking towards the near and longer-term future, there was a consensus in the meetings that the centre of strategic gravity within the Alliance was shifting South. When asked, however, whether this implied that AFSOUTH should perhaps become a principal rather than a subordinate command, the reaction was that "we are happy working for the SACEUR". Concerns were raised, however, that across-the-board NATO staff reductions did not facilitate the practical work at AFSOUTH, whereas the region still hosted the bulk of what NATO termed "old/less capable" equipment. NOTES 1. For a concise historical background to this issue, see my Final Report of the Sub-Committee on Out-of-Area Security Challenges to the Alliance, North Atlantic Assembly (May 1986). Conversely, for the AFSOUTH area of responsibility "Southern Region" denotes Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the Mediterranean and Black seas, with as many as ten nations now fully participating or closely co-operating with AFSOUTH. See also my "Regional Implementation of Indivisible Security", Trilateral Commission Working Group Papers, 1991-92, Trialogue 45 (New York 1992), p. 43, "El Mediterraneo como especio politico", Revista Espa$ola de Defensa, no. 38 1991, p.78, and Ian O. Lesser, Mediterranean Security and Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West after the Cold War, Rand Corporation 1992. 2. General James Davis, "NATO-Europe - Extending Into the South?", NATO's Sixteen Nations (no. 4, 1992), p. 21. 3. See in general House of Commons Library, Background Paper on Rapid Reaction Forces, 21 February 1992; Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, "NATO's Multinational Rapid Reaction Force", International Defense Review, Defense '92 issue; David Miller, "The Proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Corps", NATO's Sixteen Nations (December 1991); Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 August 1992; Thomas-Durell Young and William T. Johnsen, "Reforming NATO's Command and Operational Control Structures: Progress and Problems", SSI Special Report, U.S. Army War College, 30 April 1992; Lt. General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie, "The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps -Making It Work" (February 1993). 4. Ibid. note 2