/pub/history/military/nato/naa/dsc File: ak229dsc.e -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY * DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE * N.A.A. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- MILITARY TRENDS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE DRAFT FINAL REPORT MR. RAFAEL ESTRELLA (SPAIN) Rapporteur(*) International Secretariat October 1993 * Until this document has been approved by the Defence and Security Committee. It represents only the views of the Rapporteur. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii INTRODUCTION 1 I. MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2 A. The Restructuring Process 3 B. Force Categories 5 C. The Reserve Component 6 D. The Future of Conscription 7 II. RESTRUCTURING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 9 An Overview of National Defence Plans 10 CONCLUSION 27 NOTES AND REFERENCES 29 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The disappearance of a credible conventional military threat from the East, paralleled by the emergence of a myriad of non- traditional elements of instability which could threaten European security, have compelled the Atlantic Alliance to engage in a thorough review of objectives, assets and strategy. This review has had a fundamental impact on what should constitute the new Alliance force structure for the future. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, adopted in Rome in 1991, gives guidelines as to the type of force structure the new international security conditions will demand: reliance on smaller, more mobile and flexible forces; a shift away from a massive forward presence to a capacity to build up forces rapidly, if and when they might be needed; forces capable of executing diverse crisis management missions in the areas of humanitarian relief including peacekeeping and peacemaking. The new security environment has precipitated national reviews of defence planning and force structure in all Alliance countries. In contrast to the contingencies-based force structuring process on-going at NATO headquarters, defence reviews at national level are driven by strong political pressures - notably to cut defence budgets and release much needed resources. This has complicated, and is complicating, the NATO force planning process. The parallel review processes are not always complementary. The new conditions have sparked debates on the future of conscription in all countries with a tradition of "national service". Most countries have reduced the length of mandatory military service which has brought with it additional problems, more acute in some countries than in others. Alone, Belgium has opted to eliminate conscription altogether, and will soon join the USA, the UK, Canada and Iceland in the all-professional camp. The new Alliance force structure and national tendencies will call on the reserve forces in most countries to play increasingly more important roles. This is especially the case for Canada. This will present new challenges for the Alliance. In anticipation of increased interaction between active and reserve forces greater attention will need to be given to promoting integration for all missions as a means of achieving greater readiness, training and interoperability. Another key element at work in the defence planning sphere, at least in Europe, is the whole question of the eventual European Defence Identity and how this should be given expression in the short and medium term. This is given greater attention in some countries than in others. There is no consensus yet on whether the steps taken so far will strengthen or weaken the NATO integrated command structure. The Overview of National Defence Plans (Ch.II) is not exhaustive but illustrative of national developments and trends, produced for information and comparison purposes and to provoke debate. INTRODUCTION 1. Of the changes occurring within the Atlantic Alliance during this period of profound transformation, perhaps none is more fundamental than the redefinition of the roles and missions of the armed forces. The particularities of the Cold War over-emphasized the military dimension of the Alliance; in a post-war European strategic context characterized by the existence of nuclear weapons and a massive conventional military build-up in the East, the need to preserve military stability was of the highest policy relevance. Consequently, NATO came to be perceived by the general public as a strictly military organization. 2. The disappearance of a credible conventional military threat from the East, paralleled by the emergence of a myriad of non-traditional elements of instability which could threaten European security, led the Atlantic Alliance to engage in a thorough review of its objectives, assets and strategy. The conceptual basis for this review is laid out in two fundamental NATO documents: the 1990 London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance and the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, adopted by NATO's heads of state and government at the Rome summit in 1991. The Alliance's new orientations, as outlined in these two documents, provide the guidelines for NATO's adaptation to the security conditions of post-Cold War Europe. 3. The London Declaration explicitly acknowledges that the new security environment in Europe calls for fundamental changes to NATO's integrated force structure. It states most notably that, in the future, the Alliance will rely on smaller, mobile and highly flexible forces. It goes further to specify that NATO will reduce the readiness of its active units and will shift emphasis from a massive forward presence to the capacity to build up forces if and when they might be needed. 4. The new Strategic Concept represents a return to the old notion of grand strategy, namely the ability to bring together all elements military and non-military in pursuit of security. NATO leaders recognized in Rome that crisis management, in the form of intensified political consultation and enhanced confidence-building measures, has gained in relative importance over military capacity. The latter, while playing a secondary role, remains crucial for the influence it affords, as well as its projection capacity and its usefulness in enforcing political decisions. These are the assets the armed forces will bring to the Alliance's new missions in the fields of humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and eventually peacemaking. As concerns force restructuring, the Strategic Concept includes a section on the "Guidelines for Defence", which provides NATO's Military Committee with broad guidelines for the implementation of the Alliance's new strategy. 5. Parallel to the evolution occurring within the Alliance is a similar review of defence doctrine taking place at the national level. In contrast to the contingencies-based force restructuring process engaged at NATO, defence reviews at the governmental level are driven in part by strong political pressure to reduce defence spending and shift those funds to civil sectors or to reduce public deficit in times of crisis. Therefore, in light of NATO's new Strategic Concept, and in accordance with reviews conducted by national defence ministries, the governments of all NATO Allies have begun to implement defence cuts and force restructuring in a process familiarly referred to as "cashing in on the peace dividend". 6. This Report, through examining the defence planning process at first the NATO intergovernmental level and then the national level, reveals the progress made thus far in NATO force planning and the efforts by the different NATO governments to adapt to the new force requirements. This examination also reveals that these parallel processes are not always complementary. Alarm bells have already begun sounding at NATO headquarters as details of the various national defence plans become known. NATO's December 1992 Annual Defence Review has revealed that, in certain cases, these plans are not entirely in keeping with national force commitments agreed between NATO defence ministers in May 1992. An overview of selected national defence plans as they are now emerging exposes a certain divergence in national views as to the future of the armed forces and, in a broader sense, of that of the Alliance itself. 7. The North Atlantic Assembly has devoted considerable attention to the on-going defence reviews within the Atlantic Alliance, and has sponsored a series of seminars entitled "CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: THE NEW ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT." This Report draws heavily upon the outcome of these seminars which brought together government representatives, military experts and legislators from every NATO member state, as well as NATO officials directly involved in the implementation of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept. Representatives from the Alliance's co-operation partners were also present. Your Rapporteur hopes that this Report will prove particularly useful to the Assembly's members, so that they might assure that their respective parliaments keep in mind the collective interest and the need to maintain certain common criteria during the national defence review process. The outcome of this process will, indeed, determine to what extent NATO will be able to take up its roles and responsibilities in the future. I. MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 8. NATO's new Strategic Concept defines the Alliance's role in the new strategic environment. It represents a drastic break from the previous NATO strategy of Flexible Response (MC 14/3), adopted in 1967, which was based on the premise of a credible defence and detente through dialogue. These two elements are now joined by a third which emphasizes dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact adversaries.(1) This important document also recognizes the development of the European defence identity and the vital role of the CSCE in the emerging European security architecture. 9. The new Strategic Concept goes a step further in addressing the future roles of the armed forces with its section entitled "GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE", which lists the broad guidelines to be followed by NATO's Military Committee in the implementation of the new strategy. The overall size of forces is to be reduced, their state of readiness relaxed, and a linear defensive layout in the Central Region is no longer required. It emphasizes the role that the military can play in crisis management and confidence-building measures (CBM). A. The Restructuring Process 10. Throughout 1991, the Military Committee, taking into account the development of the Strategic Concept, continued its work on the new force posture. By May, it had completed initial work on this subject and announced the creation of the six multinational corps and the formation of a rapid reaction corps. Other important developments in the restructuring process were revealed at the NATO Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting in December of that year. These included the agreement to form a new command structure and the adoption of a new reinforcement concept. 11. NATO's force structure is tailored to the needs and tasks laid down in the new strategy, and is based on the following principles: - the provision of evidence of the defensive nature of the Alliance through reduced levels of high-readiness forces and major re-deployments; - a clear reliance on mobilization and reinforcement for war prevention, crisis management and defence; - greater mobility and higher combat effectiveness; - the flexible deployment of forces; - the fair sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities; - and, most importantly, a continued demonstration of Alliance cohesion through multinational formations and forces. 12. The new command structure calls for the reduction in the number of Major NATO Commands from three (European, Atlantic and Channel) to two (European and Atlantic). The three Subordinate Commands within Allied Command Europe (ACE) remain. The area of Allied Forces Southern Europe is unchanged; however, that of Allied Forces Central Europe is expanded to the north and now includes Denmark. The former area of Allied Forces Northern Europe will also be changed radically; it will now be called Allied Forces Northwestern Europe and include Norway and the United Kingdom. Northwestern Europe will be responsible for the naval defence of the English Channel and the North Sea. These decisions are subject to further detailed planning and will be implemented gradually. 13. The Major NATO Commanders are responsible for the development of defence plans for their respective areas, for the determination of force requirements and for the deployment and exercise of the forces under their command. Their reports and recommendations regarding the forces assigned to them and their logistical support are submitted to the NATO Military Committee. 14. The new reinforcement concept capitalizes on the major military consequence of the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, namely the disappearance of any military capability outside of the Alliance that can threaten all of NATO territory at the same time. ACE now has the flexibility to shift forces from non- or less-threatened areas to other areas in the event of a major conflict. The reinforcement concept is at the heart of future ACE strategic and operational planning. Based on regional requirements, generic contingency planning will determine which forces will reinforce a region, as well as when and where, because the new array of security risks makes it difficult to establish specific contingency plans. 15. The structural and operational details of the implementation of NATO's new strategy were also presented at that same December 1991 DPC meeting. These are embodied in two important Military Committee documents: "NATO Force Structures for the Mid 1990's and Beyond" (MC 317), which determines the basis for the evolution of NATO's forces; and "Military Implementation of the New Strategy" (MC 400), which amplifies the Strategic Concept and gives guidance for the military contribution in peace, crisis and war. Since the adoption of MC 317 and MC 400, NATO now has the necessary political guidance and strategic and operational concepts to enable the Alliance to continue to adapt to the changing European security environment. NATO aims for all essential elements of the new force structure to be in place by mid-1995. 16. All of the modifications to NATO's force structure described above were developed and agreed upon through NATO's integrated defence planning process. The core of this process is the INTEGRATED FORCE PLANNING MECHANISM, which allows for the collective planning of force structures between all Alliance members, and assures a fair distribution of the defence burden. The integrated force planning process also includes a collective yearly review which assesses to what extent nations live up to their commitments. In this forum, national defence ministers defend their country's record vis-a-vis these commitments before the other Alliance defence ministers. This is the process being used for the gradual transition to the new force structure. B. Force Categories 17. In order to facilitate force planning and to better determine appropriate force structures, the Alliance agreed on specific force categories. Each category comprises forces with distinct capabilities and readiness requirements. Depending on the scenario, a mix of all three force categories could conceivably be deployed simultaneously in order to respond appropriately to a developing crisis. The main distinction between these forces is not one of function, but of readiness. Main Defence Forces 18. Main Defence Forces (MDF) provide about 65 per cent of the Allied force posture. They are subordinate to the regional commanders and comprise standing forces as well as a large proportion of mobilizable forces, the majority of which will normally be held at low readiness. However, some elements of the Main Defence land forces, called READY MANOEUVRE FORCES, will be maintained at high readiness; in conjunction with air and maritime forces, they could be deployed during crisis management and for early defensive operations. MDF are to reach full deployment within 20 to 90 days. Many of the MDF, especially in the Central Region, are incorporated in a multinational Corps structure. 19. The reduced manpower strength of MDF calls for greater reliance on force build-up capabilities through reconstitution and reserve mobilization. The obvious increased importance of ready and trained reserves will confront all Alliance nations with the challenge to improve their reserve organization. The options chosen will vary from country to country, as investigated below, but the common objective must be effectiveness. Reaction Forces 20. The second category is Reaction Forces (RF), which make up about 10 to 15 per cent of the planned land force structure, except in the case of maritime assets, where they form around 40 per cent. They are highly mobile and capable multinational forces. Reaction forces will be maintained at a high degree of readiness, with employment options covering all regions of the Alliance. 21. Reaction Forces are divided into two smaller sub-categories: IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCES (IRF) and RAPID REACTION FORCES (RRF). Immediate Reaction Forces, such as the brigade-sized ACE Mobile Force (AMF), are maintained at the highest degree of readiness and are to reach full deployment within 2 to 10 days. Currently, the IRF have seven contingency deployment areas, two in the Northern Region and five in the Southern Region. RRF, such as the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), are to respond to a wide range of unpredictable circumstances, provide deterrence against a limited attack, and, if need be, defend NATO territory against short-warning attacks. RRF are to reach full deployment within 10 to 30 days. 22. NATO officials have noted a certain tendency in the various national defence plans to over accommodate NATO's Reaction Forces to the detriment of the Alliance's Main Defence Forces. General John M.D. Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), warned against this tendency in an article he contributed to a special edition of the review NATO's Sixteen Nations. "We must guard against an over-reliance on reaction forces to the detriment of other force categories. Reaction forces will always be limited in strength, endurance and fighting power and should be viewed in all deployments as the footprint of a larger force drawn from our main defence and augmentation forces. Indeed, if their deployment is to be a deterrent, it is critical that potential aggressors or adventurers recognize that reaction forces represent a statement of intent and our Alliance's willingness to deploy forces and use military force to accomplish well-defined political objectives."(2) 23. Also, it is evident that NATO's IRF and RRF, in order to be truly effective, will need to be totally, or at least partially, composed of professional soldiers. This requirement is at the source of the debate on the maintenance of conscription in those European countries which have traditionally relied on national service to provide a considerable portion of their armies. The pros and cons of this debate, as well as the demographic and social factors that influences it, are presented below. 3. Augmentation Forces 24. Augmentation forces are mostly national forces, not belonging to the ACE Reaction Forces or to the Main Defence Forces. These North American, Portuguese and, 2under certain circumstances, French and Spanish forces, could be made available to reinforce Alliance forces as operational or strategic reserves. The majority of Augmentation Forces will only be available upon mobilization. C. The Reserve Component 25. The reserve forces of the North Atlantic Alliance have been and remain an essential element for the defence and security of Europe. Now the Alliance's new force structure calls on them to play an increasingly important role in NATO's overall force potential. In accordance with NATO and national defence strategies, Alliance nations plan to reduce active forces by about 40 per cent across-the-board. Consequently, most European countries envisage small, largely professional armies, augmented with significant reserve and mobilization assets, as the eventual long-term solution. 26. However, increased reliance on reserve forces is being looked at not only for their augmentation potential; reserves also represent an attractive cost-effective, combat-capable force that makes the best use of resources in the face of national defence budget reductions. In addition, the mobilization of reserves brings vital citizen involvement and national consensus in support of military deployment in times of crisis. 27. In anticipation of increased interaction between active and reserve forces, programmes for promoting their integration should be developed as a means of achieving greater readiness, training opportunities, and interoperability. The promotion of integration should extend to gradually transferring selected missions of the active forces to the reserves, as well as making modern equipment and high-technology weapons systems available to them for training. Well-equipped and well-trained reservists have demonstrated that they can perform as professional equals in skill and dedication to their active duty counterparts. D. The Future of Conscription 28. The end of the Cold War has eliminated the strategic justification for conscription. In the past, European countries had to rely on a system of mandatory military service in order to provide the necessary number of trained soldiers that would be needed in the event of a large-scale conflict. In the present context of a drastically diminished conventional military threat and long warning times, the concept of conscription has begun to lose the support and validity it used to enjoy. 29. This situation has sparked a debate on the future of conscription in all NATO countries with a tradition of "national service". The debate has gathered momentum as several Alliance countries have already reduced the length of mandatory military service. Germany has reduced the length of service to 12 months, young Frenchmen will now only serve for 10 months, and the Spanish will complete only 9 months. In Portugal the fixed conscription period is now only 4 months but is extendable for a further 4 months on a voluntary basis. These countries are now intensifying their recruitment of volunteers. Belgium has decided to eliminate conscription altogether, joining the United Kingdom, Iceland, Canada and the United States as the only NATO countries with entirely professional armies. 30. The argument for the complete elimination of conscription is often made principally on practical grounds. Here, it is argued, the tendency toward reducing the length of military service undermines the preparedness of conscript troops. Many military experts agree that a period of service short of 10 to 12 months does not allow for sufficient training. With NATO's new force structuring calling for an overall reduction in force levels and greater training and readiness standards for troops, well-trained, professionally-oriented soldiers will be at a premium. 31. However, aside from these practical considerations, conscript forces are seen to offer certain other advantages notwithstanding, which are added to the widely-held belief that the defence of the motherland is the duty of all citizens, a principle which appears in some of the European constitutions. Armies comprising a considerable proportion of conscripts are generally less expensive (inferior salaries, less strain on pension funds, less problems associated with housing and reconversion). In addition, they provide personnel from all social groups and educational levels, capable of being trained to operate a broad range of sophisticated equipment. 32. European countries also have to take demographics into consideration when considering between professional or mixed professional/conscript armies. Many countries simply do not have a sufficient population base to support all-professional armies, even if they were to offer competitive salaries. Evidence of this problem was provided by the United Kingdom which was short of 20,000 recruits in early 1990, despite proposing a starting monthly salary of 711. On the other hand, there is another argument that should not be dismissed: in countries of great economic and cultural imbalances between different regions, an all-volunteer army would be almost entirely composed of soldiers coming from the most impoverished regions, thereby weakening the national unity. 33. It should also be noted that, between countries with mandatory military service, there are nuances as to what options are open to conscripts. Certain European countries have added a social service dimension to national service. In countries where social service is offered as an alternative to military service, this option is not only considered a right but enjoys broad social acceptance. This concept of national service, broader than the strict concept of military service, provides these countries, under the basis of conscription, with a large number of social workers and is a basis for national cohesion. This would be the case of Germany, which has about 100,000 of such social workers. 34. Military staff are quite apt at listing all the advantages and disadvantages of professional and conscript armies. Despite being somewhat attached to the patriotic justifications for maintaining conscription, the national military staff of most European armies would also be in favour of creating all-volunteer armies, in order to acquire the obvious advantages they afford; i.e. better trained troops (basic training goes to better use), higher theatre flexibility, less ware on equipment, and excellent cohesion of units. 35. Everything indicates that, in the foreseeable future, the current public debate on whether to shift from conscript to voluntary armies will continue to be based most on social and political considerations. In the case of the most populated countries, the timing and length of that process will largely depend on the financial factor. The defence reviews currently under way in NATO countries will determine the requirement in number of troops and their varying levels of readiness. However, given the range of factors involved some of them with deep historical roots on which historical models are based, it is the Rapporteur's opinion that the effective political decisions required should be based on thorough consideration of the wide array of elements conditioning the issue. Political consensus in each country will be necessary to achieve decisions which take full consideration of national and collective security interests. II. RESTRUCTURING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL "Whether due to the magic of round numbers, an exorcism of a modern terror of the new millennium, or a simple media commodity, everything seems to be converging toward the emergence in the year 2000 of a new military order in Europe." Gen. Bernard de Bressy, former military adviser to the French delegation to the North Atlantic Council (3) 36. The national armies of the Atlantic Alliance are currently in a phase of profound transformation. During this phase, two important dates will mark the milestones along the path toward the new European military order, those of 1995 and 2000. 37. In principle, the year 1995 will see the complete withdrawal of ex-Soviet troops still stationed outside the borders of the former USSR. The reductions in conventional military capacity required by the CFE treaty should also be completed by November 1995. The year 2000 will see the implementation of the START I treaty signed by presidents Bush and Yeltsin in July 1991. By this date, it is planned that the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia will have been reduced by two-thirds. 38. These two dates of 1995 and 2000 have been adopted as reference points by several European nations in the restructuring of their armed forces to meet the conditions of today's security environment. It is thus that in 1995 the German army will have been reduced to the levels prescribed by the Two Plus Four agreement, and that the United Kingdom should have, in theory, implemented its Options for Change defence plans. The year 2000 should also see the final implementation stages of the Spanish Far 2000 defence plans and the French Armees 2000 force restructuring. 39. While these diverse plans are each based on differing national perspectives of present and future security risks, they share many common denominators. Each aims to adapt its armies to their new roles as instruments of crisis prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping. As a consequence, the tendency is toward the creation of scaled-down military formations which are more mobile, more professional and, at least in principle, better equipped. An Overview of National Defence Plans 40. The following survey of the defence reviews under way in most of the NATO countries provides an overview of the general military trends within the Alliance, while exposing the various national nuances to these trends. 41. Your Rapporteur concedes that the following short study places disproportionate emphasis on each individual country's defence plans with respect to its land forces. This can be explained by the scale of restructuring in this service in each NATO country. In addition, when NATO officials express concern about the extent of defence cuts, they frequently cite the drastic reductions in land forces, especially those earmarked for Main Defence Forces. It is also considered by the Rapporteur to be particularly germane in light of the current debate about the new and urgent requirements for peacekeeping forces. Belgium 42. The restructuring of the Belgian armed forces is scheduled to be completed in 1997. On 3 July 1992, the Belgian Defence Minister, Mr. Leo Delcroix, published the main features of his defence restructuring plan which caused a considerable amount of concern at NATO. On 26 November 1992, Manfred Worner said in a letter to Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene that this plan "could harm the cohesion of the Alliance and the equitable division of roles and responsibilities". A resume of the report by the Chief of the General Staff, containing a study of the procedures for implementing the Delcroix plan, was submitted by the Defence Minister to the Belgian Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers approved the basic principles of the Delcroix plan, while taking into account the concerns of NATO and the remarks made by the Belgian parliamentarians: - the defence budget ceiling will be BF 98 billion until the end of 1997; - conscription will be abolished from the 1994 class onwards; - Belgium will meet its NATO force commitments. 43. The Belgian armed forces will total 40,000 active forces (2,500 in instruction) with a reserve force, the size of which will be determined at a later date. Ground forces will be about 27,500 with 10,000 air forces and a naval force of about 2,500. The Belgian armed forces will be effectively reduced by between 40 to 50 per cent. The future force structures of the land forces will include a Para-Commando Brigade with rapid availability to be assigned to NATO's ARRC, and a Mechanized Division comprised of about 12,000 men which will be made available to the Eurocorps by 1 January, 1995. The Belgian units assigned to the Eurocorps are mainly from the 1st Infantry Brigade from Bourg-Leopold, the 7th Mechanized Infantry Brigade from Marche, and the 17th Mechanized Infantry Brigade from Spich, Germany. This Mechanized Division will also be directly linked to NATO as the "Central Region Ready Manoeuvre Division" and via the AFCENT (Allied Forces Central Europe) command of SHAPE. 44. The change from a conscription army to one that is entirely professional will by most accounts be difficult. According to informed Belgian military sources, the country will have difficulty meeting NATO force commitments. The Belgian General Staff anticipates problems, due to the budget constraints, in attracting a sufficient number of recruits for an all-regular army with strong reserves. 45. The abolition of conscription is demanding a complete overhaul of the force structure of the Belgian army. The Belgian Defence Ministry is examining one possible solution to the recruitment problem in calling on "short-term volunteers". These volunteers may then be required to complete a few years of reserve service at the end of enlistment. Until now, the quasi-totality of reservists had been supplied by conscripts at the end of their service. The abolition of conscription will also significantly affect certain specialized functions usually carried out by reservists based on their civilian qualifications in the fields of engineering, medicine, law and computer science. The shortages of such qualified personnel will have to be made up by staff officers, non-commissioned officers and civilians. Canada 46. The most comprehensive recent statement of priorities for the Canadian forces is the government document "Canadian Defence Policy" released in April 1992. It lists three distinct priorities, in descending order of importance to Canadian national security: 1) defence, sovereignty and civil responsibilities in Canada; 2) collective defence arrangements through NATO, including the continental defence partnership with the United States; 3) international peace and security through stability and peacekeeping operations, arms control verification and humanitarian assistance. 47. These priorities dictate the maintenance of flexible and capable armed forces. The "Total Force Concept" (TFC), officially introduced by the 1987 Defence White Paper, "Challenge and Commitment", remains the basis of, and rationale for, the Canadian forces structure. A central element in the TFC is the acknowledgement that it is now both impractical and undesirable for Canada to try to meet its personnel requirements through the Regular Force. Accordingly, the responsibilities of the Canadian Reserve Force are in the process of being more integrated into the TFC in such a way that the distinction between regular and reserve personnel will be greatly reduced. The reserve force will also take on additional specific tasks. 48. The TFC concept was reaffirmed as the basis on which the Canadian forces are being restructured in the above-cited Defence White Paper. This means that Canadian units and formations deployed for operations will consist of a combination of regular and reserve personnel. The four services began implementing the TFC in 1987, each tailoring the concept to their different needs. 49. Of the four services, the army - or the Land Forces - continues to be the one most affected by the TFC and the attendant force structure changes. According to the 1992 defence policy statement the Regular Force, currently standing at 84,000 will be reduced to around 73,000 (final date of implementation not yet determined), while the Primary Reserve and Supplementary Reserve Forces will increase from, respectively, 29,000 and 15,000 to 40,000 and 25,000. The implementation of the TFC for the Canadian army will necessitate an entirely new force structure, which has been dubbed ARMY 2000. 50. The implications of this for NATO is that the Fourth Mechanized Brigade will be withdrawn from Europe and disbanded, with the bases in Germany from where they will be withdrawn, closed by 1995. For the future, Canadian field forces specifically assigned to Europe will consist only of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force-committed battalion group, based in Canada. The Department of National Defence has also stated that a contingency brigade group can be deployed anywhere in the world (including to Europe for operations under NATO auspices) at relatively short notice. 51. In the peacekeeping area - where Canada has unmatched experience - there has been an intense debate over the last year in the country. Four issues have taken prominence in this debate: 1) the most appropriate training of the forces (general purpose combat training or special conflict resolution skills, for example, whether to create peacekeeping training centres); 2) the increasing use of reservists (at present over 800 of which are deployed abroad out of a total of some 4,500); 3) the length of deployment and participation in operations; 4) the nature of, and transition to, peace-enforcement operations. 52. Contributing to this debate have been reports issued in 1993 from the House of Commons, "The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping" and the Senate, "Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping". 53. The central thrust of these two parliamentary reports is that peacekeeping operations were changing in fundamental ways. In order to remain an effective support of the UN Canada needed to adapt to the changing demands of UN operations. This debate is not a novel one for Canada but the quality of the two reports and the public discussion which they have generated suggest strongly that Canada is further along than most Allied countries in understanding the magnitude and the complexities of the tasks which will be required for the future. Denmark 54. According to Danish defence plans, the army will see force reductions and a shortening of the initial training of conscripts in the coming years. These force reductions, accompanied by structural adaptations, aim to realize a net saving over the period covered by the 1993-1994 Defence Agreement ($101 million in 1993 and $176 million in 1994). The current defence budget stands at some $2.5 billion. 55. The Defence Agreement foresees a reduction in the army's wartime strength by 16,000 soldiers; those will be taken from low-priority reserve units during the period of 1993-1996. In this context, the Danish Home Guard will increase in importance. It is hoped that its units can, in the future, assume tasks until now assigned to relatively low-priority units in the Regular Army. 56. Denmark's Home Guard, created in 1948, is 70,000 strong. It is composed of volunteer soldiers who train in their spare time and keep their arms and equipment at home; with its strong links to the civil population, the Home Guard contributes directly to the strengthening of the general will to defend the country. Its main tasks, in support of the three armed services, are: surveillance; security of rear area and key points; demolition; traffic control and communications; and observation and reporting of low-flying aircraft. In this way, the Home Guard performs tasks which, in other European countries, are assigned to conscripts and reserve units. 57. Denmark's Jutland Division remains the major Danish contribution to NATO's Main Defence Forces. It will acquire enhanced mobility through the procurement of armoured recovery vehicles and bridge-layers; it will therefore be able to accomplish its tasks in the LANDJUT Multinational Corps. It has also been decided that one of the Zealand Brigades will be changed into a formation that can be used to carry out a broad spectrum of international tasks, from humanitarian interventions to actual combat operations. As from the end of 1995, the formation is to be organized as a brigade which can be placed at the disposal of NATO, primarily for the RRF, as well as participate in national defence. 58. Last July Denmark announced that it would create a new brigade called the Danish Reaction Brigade (often referred to as the "International Brigade"). The brigade will be made up of 4,550 soldiers. In addition to being at the disposal of the United Nations, the CSCE for peacekeeping purposes and for the defence of Denmark, the brigade will also form a part of NATO's RRC. The Reaction Brigade, which should be operational by the end of 1995, will be an efficient and flexible force able to operate independently, intervening at short notice for a wide variety of tasks. The relevant legislation for the setting up of the Reaction Brigade is expected to be passed by the Danish parliament this autumn. France 59. The reorganization of the French armed forces is characterized by an intense debate over the future of conscription. France has a long tradition of "national service" dating back to the French Revolution. President Fran ois Mitterrand sees no reason to change compulsory military service, and claims that "nothing can replace the collective effort, without which national defence loses its true sense".(4) In a July Le Figaro poll, 69 per cent of those asked said they hope that the compulsory military service will be maintained. The length of military service in France was recently reduced from 12 to 10 months. 60. France's army is presently composed 60 per cent of conscripts (compared with 39 per cent for the air force and 30 per cent for the navy). Former Defence Minister Pierre Joxe had planned to reduce the army from its present 260,000 to 225,000 by 1997, maintaining the present proportion of conscripts. 61. For its part, the new French government has decided to increase the 1994 defence budget by some 3 per cent (FF198.3 billion) compared to that of 1993 (FF 192.4 billion). Out of this amount, FF102 billion will go towards the equipment of the armed forces. 62. Although France does not participate in NATO's integrated military structure, it has nevertheless pledged to co-operate with its NATO Allies in the event of war; recent military restructuring takes this into account. The Armees 2000 plan, adopted in 1989, has guided recent organizational changes in France's army. This plan consolidated the three corps earmarked for European operations into two larger corps, comprising five armoured divisions and two motorized infantry divisions. The lighter Rapid Reaction Force, intended for intervention operations, comprises one parachute division, one air-transportable marine division, one light armoured division, one mountain division, and one air-mobile infantry division. In addition, France has one light armoured regiment and one mechanized infantry regiment assigned to the Franco-German brigade, as well as nine French Foreign Legion regiments. 63. According to a recent briefing given by the Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Amedee Monchal, the army should be comprised of eight divisions, following the current restructuring which is due to be completed by 1997. According to the General, the composition of these eight divisions will be as follows: three armoured divisions; two light armoured divisions - one amphibious and one continental -; one air-mobile division; one parachute division; and one mountain division.The General insisted that his plan for restructuring the army constitutes the level under which the army would be constrained to lose its associated capabilities. The plans for the restructuring of the French armed forces will be submitted to parliament next spring. 64. In terms of the relationship between French forces and the NATO integrated command structure, it is worth highlighting the recent French decision to allow its units assigned to the Eurocorps to be placed under the operational command of the SACEUR. However, for French troops to be placed under NATO command, three conditions must be met: (1) both Germany and France must formally agree to do so; (2) the troops must be needed for a very specific mission, the details of which must be approved by French authorities; and, (3) the corps must be engaged as such (it is not yet clear if this means that the corps must be engaged in its entirety, or if it can be broken down, providing its composition remains Franco-German). Germany 65. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany announced on 8 February that, due to the monumental costs of reunification, "it is important that the Bundeswehr be included in general cost-cutting measures". It is thus that Germany's 1993 defence budget has been reduced by nearly 4 per cent to $31 billion (2.2 per cent of GDP) in order to realize savings of $530 million. The budget should be cut by another 20 per cent by 1996. In addition, all armaments procurement plans are to be frozen. Chancellor Kohl's comprehensive package of budget cuts is known as the "solidarity pact" in support of the eastern landers. 66. Germany now has 422,000 troops, down from 550,000 after reunification in 1990. Under agreements that paved the way for reunification, Bonn committed itself to a ceiling of 370,000 by 1994. However, Chancellor Kohl announced in Munich that he might reduce troop levels still further. 67. In accordance with the process of restructuring and multinationalization of NATO forces, it has been envisaged to form two US-German army corps of between 35,000 to 50,000 troops each. The US-German Corps will be used only for defence; in peace time, there will only be a small multinational staff made up of about 18 officers per corps. In addition, it was announced on 30 March that a joint German-Dutch army corps will be created around 1995; it will be completely integrated into NATO forces and open to other Alliance countries. The corps headquarters will be established at Munster with the main element of the Dutch forces stationed in peacetime in the Netherlands. The German-Dutch Corps will be placed under command headed alternately by a German or Dutch officer. Like the US-German Corps, the German-Dutch Corps will be part of NATO's Main Defence Forces, which means that they will be held at lower readiness and will not be immediately available in times of crisis. 68. The ongoing debate over defence cuts in Germany has been overshadowed by the much more fundamental debate over the future roles of the German armed forces. This debate centres around the interpretation of Article 87a, paragraph 2 of the German Basic Law (the Grundgesetz). In 1982, under the influence of then-Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Article 87a was further consolidated by two Federal Security Council directives which explicitly limit the German armed forces to the NATO area. Although these directives do not directly modify the Gundgesetz, they have come to be regarded as implicit constitutional provisions. Mr. Genscher's Free Democrats (FDP) are the strongest supporters of constitutional revision as a prerequisite to an expanded international role for the Bundeswehr. 69. Proponents of an expanded role for the Bundeswehr evoke Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Grundgesetz, relevant to Germany's participation in a system of mutual collective security. Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats (CDU) and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), argue that Article 24, in combination with Article 43 of the UN Charter, obliging UN members to place troops at the Security Council's disposal, is sufficient legal backing for international Bundeswehr activity. As for the opposition Social Democrats (SPD), as this Report went to print the majority opinion appeared to be that Germany should not participate in any military action other than those UN peacekeeping missions that do not involve "active deployment". However, strong and influential figures in the Party do not share this view. 70. One can be sure that the current political deliberations on this issue will eventually lead toward an expanded role for the Bundeswehr within NATO structures; such an evolution enjoys broad support from Germany's NATO Allies. Progress was made in this direction on 8 April when, by a vote of 5 to 3, the German Constitutional Court condoned the participation of German pilots in the enforcement of the UN-ordered no-flight zone over Bosnia. This mission constitutes the German armed forces' first combat role abroad since World War II. 71. On 1 May, 1993, Germany's Cabinet unanimously approved Chancellor Kohl's decision to send 1,640 German troops to join the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia. In June the German Constitutional Court rejected a petition for a preliminary ruling from the SPD that called for the withdrawal of German troops in Somalia. The Court has required the Bundestag to debate the question and formally approve the mission if it is to continue. The Bonn coalition FDP Chairman (and German Foreign Minister) Klaus Kinkel has called for an amendment to the Basic Law to allow Bundeswehr missions outside NATO territory to be decided on a case-by-case basis with a vote of a two-thirds majority - in practice all three parties - in parliament. Chancellor Kohl is against the introduction of a two-thirds majority into the Basic Law as a prerequisite for German participation in future UN operations as this would effectively keep the army at home. The opposition SPD Chairman Rudolf Sharping supports Foreign Minister Kinkel's proposal. 72. Despite this ongoing constitutional debate, an initial group of two hundred German soldiers were sent on 3 August to the Belet Huen region of Somalia. Their mission is to provide logistical support for the UN troops stationed there. By the end of August there was a total of 1,700 German troops deployed in Somalia. Polls show that Germans remain divided over the issue. In a recent poll published in Der Spiegel magazine, 51 per cent of those polled were in favour of withdrawing German soldiers from Somalia if they come under fire, while 42 per cent disagreed. Italy 73. In October 1992, Italy's then Defence Minister, Salvo Ando, presented a "New Defence Model" which was a modified version of that of his predecessor Rognoni. Although approved by the government on 30 December 1992, it was never presented before parliament. The new Defence Minister, Mr. Fabio Fabbri, has yet to make clear his own defence plan for the future of Italy's armed forces. 74. Defence Minister Ando's New Defence Model was expected to be fully implemented within seven to ten years. The document outlines the major troop cuts for the armed forces. The Army was to be cut by 36 per cent and the Navy and the Air Force by 20 per cent each. The Army would have a total of 150,000 active forces (39,500 officers and 110,500 soldiers); the Navy 40,000; and the Air Force some 60,000. In aggregate terms the armed forces would fall from the 1992 level of 360,000 to 250,000. The proportion of professional volunteers, on short- and medium-term contracts, would be increased from 4.9 per cent currently to 29 per cent (nearly 50,000 men) of the troop total. Conscripts would be reduced from 214,000 to 123,500 (or from nearly 60 per cent to 43 per cent). 75. According to Mr. Ando's plan, Italy's armed forces would be divided into three categories. The first is "Ready Intervention Forces" which would be fully operational and respond to NATO's IRF. This force would be comprised of five brigades (it is thought that these forces would compose one light armoured brigade, one mechanized brigade, one armoured brigade, one alpine brigade, and one "corazzata" brigade.) The "secondary" forces would be comprised of seven or eight brigades (probably one "corazzata", five or six mechanized brigades and one alpine brigade). The third category would be exclusively reserve forces. 76. One of the principal goals of Mr. Ando's New Defence Model is for the armed services to focus on quality instead of quantity while achieving a greater integration within their traditional alliances, NATO and WEU. Italy currently spends only 1.2 percent of its gross national product on defence. This percentage is expected to increase over the next few years. According to Mr. Ando's New Defence Model, the defence budget should rise to 21,100 billion lira in 2003 from the 1993 amount of 18,183. Some 52 per cent of the defence budget currently goes to payroll costs, while only 12 to 13 per cent is used for investment spending. According to some, in order to bring Italy closer to the European average, investment spending should be around 30 per cent of the defence budget. 77. In terms of peacekeeping the scale of Italy's current involvement with UN forces represents its biggest overseas commitment of ground troops since 1945. So far, Italy has contributed about 2,600 troops to the UN force in Mogadishu, Somalia, and has also sent peacekeepers to Mozambique. In addition, air bases in northern Italy are used by the United States and Allied warplanes to enforce the UN air exclusion zone over Bosnia. The Netherlands 78. Recent developments in the European security context have prompted the Dutch government to make modifications to its Defence White Paper, first published in the spring of 1991. Due to the significantly reduced military threat from the East, combined with the necessity to reallocate public funds, the Dutch government has decided to make further cuts in the defence budget. Consequently, the 1993 defence budget of $7.5 million will be reduced to $7.3 million within the next four years, and is to remain frozen at this level for the next ten years. 79. A key element of the Dutch government's defence reorganization plans is the phasing out of mandatory military service by 1998. The requisite direct "deployability" of units for crisis management operations was the determining factor in this decision. During a five-year transition period, the obligation to enlist will be abolished or suspended; during this transition period, the length of military service will be reduced from 12 to 9 months, as from 1 January 1994. The Dutch armed services, especially the army, aim to benefit from significantly increased operational deployability with an all-professional army. 80. The Dutch army's peace time strength is to be reduced by 54 per cent (as opposed to the 35 per cent assumed in the 1991 Defence White Paper) over the period from 1991 to 2000. The army's resulting peacetime strength will be no more than 70,000 - navy 17,500, army 36,000, air force 13,000, military police 3,600 - including civilians, as compared to 150,000 currently. Concerning the new Dutch-German Corps, State Secretary Tom Frinking has recently reiterated that both the Netherlands and Germany would welcome other NATO members' participation in this corps. According to Mr. Frinking, "these multinational formations will strengthen intra-European and transatlantic links and counter the renationalization of defence and security policy in the Alliance". 81. Once reorganization has been completed in 1998, the overall strength of the armed forces can be augmented to over 110,000 personnel in the event of a major conflict (23,700 Royal Netherlands Army, 21,000 Royal Netherlands Air Force, 4,500 Royal Marechaussee); this level is to be obtained by calling up reserve personnel. 82. The Dutch government stresses that the NATO Allies were consulted with respect to the defence policy currently proposed, and that their comments were incorporated into the government's defence plans, in particular as regards the wartime size of the army forces. 83. Mr. Tom Frinking, State Secretary for Defence, has recently called for increasing armaments co-operation in order to remedy NATO's serious interoperability problems. Mr. Frinking pointed out to the "International Round Table on NATO and European Security" held in Washington on 25 June that "effective NATO forces require a much higher degree of equipment standardization and interoperability". In addition, Mr. Frinking noted the "sharp decline in defence budgets and in the size of national forces and inventories" which has "resulted in an even sharper reduction of orders for new defence equipment" thereby "causing a drastic rationalization of defence industries." Norway 84. The future defence requirements of Norway will be based on the "Defence Study 1991" -the Chief of Defence's military recommendations on the future, defence structure for Norway - and the "Defence Commission 1990" report, the findings of the all-party parliamentary body. The latter recommended what it believed was politically feasible to achieve based on a certain future budget level. 85. In terms of the army component the parliamentary commission has recommended a structure containing one division and six brigades, while the "Defence Study 1991" calls for a structure embodying nine brigades. 86. Whatever the outcome, the precise force planning goals for the next five years are expected to be clarified in the Long Term Report which is expected to be released at the end of 1993. This report builds on the assumptions laid down in the two above mentioned studies. One central assumption common to both is that it will result in the most comprehensive restructuring of the Norwegian armed forces in modern times. The aim will be to create a modern, effective army but at almost 50 per cent existing force levels by the end of the 1990s. 87. Presently the peacetime strength of the Norwegian army stands at approximately 20,000 (approximately 160,000 after mobilization (A.M.)); the Norwegian Air Force some 9,500 (37,000 A.M.) and the Norwegian Navy around 8,000 (33,000 A.M.). 88. The changes in NATO's command structure and the diminution in the NATO infrastructure programme - which is likely to affect Norway to a significant extent - will be central elements in determining national force goals and requirements for the coming five years. The Norwegian conscript-based defence concept - enshrined in the Norwegian constitution - may be critically affected in the new strategic and economic environment. 89. A decision has been made to establish a new battalion battle group which will be Norway's contribution to NATO's Immediate Reaction Force (IRF). This IRF battalion will basically be an infantry one with the necessary support functions, organization training and equipment adapted to the specific NATO requirements. 90. The new demands being placed on the United Nations in the peacekeeping and peace enforcing area - the former of which Norway has extensive experience in - will also throw up radically new challenges which will require creative thinking and flexible force options. In this respect it is worth mentioning that the Norwegian government has for some time expressed its willingness to be instrumental in the setting up of - and the working of - a new NATO peacekeeping centre devoted to the training of Alliance forces for this new and demanding environment. Portugal 91. A far-reaching modernization programme is being implemented in Portugal. The government is to spend 150 billion escudos ($1,10 billion) over the next five years to re-equip the armed forces. The army will receive 58 billion escudos ($0,43 billion) with the air force and the navy receiving 47 and 45 billion escudos ($0,33 and 0,35 billion) respectively. Of the total amount needed, only 3 billion escudos ($0,02 billion) will come from outstanding past payments with respect to now-expired agreements with Germany and France for the past use of the Beja and Flores bases by these two countries. In addition, the Portugese government has received a 30 billion escudos ($0,22 billion) loan from the United States for the purchase of new F-16 aircraft. This agreement, however, is not linked to the use by the United States of the Lages base. 92. In addition to the modernization programme, the Portuguese armed forces are undergoing a considerable amount of restructuring. The army is planning the creation of a new airborne brigade which is due to become operational early next year. The army already has a combined arms brigade (earmarked for NATO), a light infantry task force, and three infantry brigades. According to the Army Chief of Staff, Cerqueira Rocha, the objective of the restructuring is to ensure the maximum use of available resources while increasing the armed forces' operational capability. Currently, Portugal has 58,300 active forces of which 32,800 are conscripts. Portugal has 190,000 reserves. 93. As has been pointed out, the present conscription period is 4 months although this is extendable on a discretionary basis upon a decision by the Ministry of Defence. Considerable numbers of young Portuguese conscripts express interest in serving the additional 4 months of service. Spain 94. Spain began the most recent restructuring of its land forces in 1990. The guidelines for this process are outlined in the Joint Strategic Plan 1990, which determined that the operational structure of the army would consist of the following main elements: a Rapid Action Force; Manoeuvre Force; and Territorial Defence Force. These new force categories permit the reduction of permanently activated force levels while maintaining units with a high degree of readiness and adequate mobilization capacity. 95. Both the Rapid Action Force and the Manoeuvre Force have particular roles to play in crisis management. The Rapid Action Force is an agile and flexible instrument with which Spain can provide an initial response. The Manoeuvre Force, containing the main combat power, has a capacity for sustained action. 96. The peculiar "Spanish model", derived from the Referendum for the accession of Spain to NATO, has proved to be a flexible and efficient one. Although not participating in NATO's military structure, Spain is a member of the DPC and other relevant committees and participates in NATO planning procedures. Operationally, the six Co-ordination Agreements between Spain and NATO define the missions assigned to the Spanish armed forces. Spanish forces could be placed under NATO operational control while remaining under Spanish command. The presence of "liaison officers" ensures the effectiveness of Spanish forces in the planning of missions, thereby enhancing co-ordination and interoperability. 97. Following the adoption of NATO's new Strategic Concept, Spain took steps to further adapt its force structure to the general military evolution in Europe. Accordingly, a ministerial directive of 30 January 1992 established the FAR task force, which was assimilated with the newly restructured forces. FAR is designed as a flexible task force, able to act in the shortest possible notice, alone or in co-operation with friendly or Allied forces, in any place where the interests of Spain are threatened. The general missions of the FAR are: to constitute the Spanish army's first response to a crisis or conflict; and to channel Spanish participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations which require land forces. One of the most marked characteristics of the FAR is its modular or adaptable organization, in which any type of formation or unit in the army can be integrated. 98. The manpower of the Spanish armed forces has been reduced by 40,000 men, of which 36,000 were taken from the army. It is expected that there will also be a 14 per cent reduction in the number of officers and non-commissioned officers by 1997. It is envisaged to recruit 50,000 volunteers in order to form a force of 180,000 troops consisting of 50 per cent professionals. 99. The Spanish contribution to NATO's new force structure directly affects the FAR, since it is called upon to co-operate with the RF, through the contribution of some of its units or as a whole. This contribution could take the form of a battalion supplied to the IRF, or groupings of different types of brigades (parachute, Legion light infantry, mountain). 100. Spain is also considering making some forces available to the Eurocorps. The Spanish Minister of Defence has said that Spain will make its decision in the autumn of 1993 once the staff headquarters of the corps is operational. Spain will most likely contribute one brigade (4,000 men) which would be available by spring 1994. United Kingdom 101. Former Defence Secretary Tom King, in his 1990 Options for Change proposals, suggested substantial reductions in force levels as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. Under the programme, the army was to have been reduced by 40,000 to 116,000 by 1995. Since these proposals were put forward there has been much talk of "overstretch", too few resources to match compelling commitments. The House of Commons Defence Committee urged the government to review the cuts, which were widely criticized by senior army officers. As a consequence of the renewed defence review, the troop level of 116,000 was rounded up to 119,000 due to engagements in Northern Ireland and abroad. 102. After making allowances for the Gulf War expenditures, the British defence budget has steadily fallen in real terms since 1986. The government plans to continue this trend though the 1990s. Labour Party opposition leaders have advocated reducing the level of expenditure on defence from the current 4 per cent to around 3 per cent of GDP, a level more in line with other NATO Allies. 103. The British government's 1992 Statement on the Defence Estimates which sees potential threats to Britain's security as having fractured rather than disappeared, concludes that, in line with NATO's Strategic Concept, Britain's armed forces, although smaller, will in future be "more mobile, flexible and better equipped". 104. The United Kingdom will be a principal contributor to the ARRC, which will be under the command of a British Lieutenant General. Of its two divisions, the United Kingdom is contributing its 24 Airmobile Brigade to the Multinational Division (Central). This contribution will replace the British Army of the Rhine. The United Kingdom's military personnel based on the European continent will be reduced from around 56,000 (as of April 1990) to approximately 23,000 by the middle of the decade. The RAF presence in Germany will be cut from about 11,000 personnel to 6,000. The United Kingdom is also planning to make substantial contributions to NATO's Immediate Reaction Forces. 105. On 5 July 1993, the government published this year's Defence White Paper, entitled Defending Our Future. This document divides Britain's defence activity into three main roles: - protection of the UK and its dependent territories ( 9 billion for 1993-4); - Britain's continued contribution to NATO ( 10.5 billion); - promotion of the UK's wider interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability ( 50 million). These roles are broken down into 50 military tasks with the necessary troop strength and equipment needed. The government's defence budget for 1993/94 is 23.5 billion, 240 million less than last year. Out of the total budget 39 per cent will be spent on equipment, 42 per cent on pay, and 19 per cent on works and services. The paper illustrates that the defence budget will have declined by 12 per cent over five years. The government anticipates that by 1995/96 defence spending will account for about 3.2 per cent of GDP, compared to 3.9 per cent in 1993/94 and 4.1 per cent in 1991/92. 106. RAF and Navy personnel levels set out in the White Paper are 70,000 and 52,500 respectively. These numbers are expected to fall even further. As announced by the Secretary of State for Defence on 3 February, the planned size of the Army for the mid-1990's has increased from 116,000 to 119,000. It is estimated that out of this amount 60,000 will be needed by the mid-1990's for Northern Ireland. As a result of additional reorganization and efficiency measures, the army will have a total of 41 infantry battalions. The all-party Commons Select Committee on Defence in its February 1992 report had urged the government to halt all infantry cuts. As of 27 May the total strength of Britain's regular armed forces had fallen to 274,800, a drop of more than 18,500 over the last year. The restructuring of the British armed forces has resulted in the army emerging as the core of the British military, with the air force and the navy taking up supporting roles in peacekeeping missions. 107. The new White Paper eradicates distinctions between "in" and "out of" NATO area in defence planning. According to the white paper, the new criteria for involvement will be "the depth of British and allied interests involved and the implications of the crisis for international peace and stability". "Multiple earmarking" will allow Britain's forces to be assigned to several tasks on the assumption that not every contingency will have to be met at once. The paper points out that while the total defence budget is 23.5 billion, Britain's forces are ready for some 43 billion-worth of contingencies. However, the white paper emphasizes that these reduced forces will need to be fully equipped for their assigned tasks. However, in its recent report, the Commons Select Committee on Defence announced its concerns about "the current state of overstretch": "We are not convinced that the army is large enough to meet all of its present or prospective commitments without unacceptable strain." 108. Concerning the third role of Britain's armed forces, while the White Paper acknowledges that Britain must be prepared to join UN peacekeeping operations to fulfil its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the paper also warns that "we will of course have to balance our involvement in these operations against existing commitments, capabilities, available resources and foreign policy objectives". Britain, therefore, has rejected Boutros Boutros-Ghali's recommendation that UN member countries establish special forces to stand by for peacekeeping duties. The White Paper draws attention to the shortcomings of the UN's military planning capacity, and does not make any response to the Secretary General's proposal to revive the UN's military Staff Committee. Also, Britain has decided to continue to charge peacekeeping costs to the Foreign Office budget, and not to the Defence Ministry as was recently called for by the Defence Committee in its report on United Kingdom Peacekeeping and Intervention Forces. The Committee also suggested that certain units in the three armed services should be "explicitly or implicitly" identified as likely candidates for peacekeeping duties. The committee acknowledged that force levels were too low to put them on permanent short-notice standby for the UN, but if this were possible it would avoid "a frantic last-minute scramble to find a battalion, ship or squadron". A concern was also voiced in the report that Britain has "a special responsibility as one of the permanent members of the security council" and must therefore increase its participation in the growing UN peacekeeping operations. The United States 109. The Pentagon also proceeded toward addressing post-Cold War threats by including certain new items in its budget request. Notably these included a new budget line item for peacekeeping, along with additional funds for humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Reorganization of the senior Pentagon hierarchy also reflected these new priorities. On the other hand, the budgets of each of the armed services have been reduced from FY93 levels. Aiming to realize $88 billion in savings by 1997, the budget projects defence spending dropping steadily to $246 billion in 1997, before rising again to $253.9 billion in 1998. By that time, defence spending will be just 3 per cent of GDP, a level not seen since before the second world war. 110. The real extent of defence cuts is still unclear because the Clinton Administration's budget plan does not reveal its economic assumptions or its details. The budget resolves none of the outstanding questions over costly and controversial equipment programmes; funding is essentially preserved for all large procurement programmes, pending the outcome of the defence review. Consequently, actual defence cuts could conceivably be much deeper. 111. During 1979-1985 the US defence budget experienced real annual growth. Since then, however, the annual budgets have decreased in terms of their percentage of Gross National Product and percentage of the total federal budget. The US Department of Defense's FY94 defence budget request of $263.4 billion makes only minor adjustments to the Bush Administration's version. However, it does represent the most significant reduction in defence expenditure since the beginning of this trend. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and his staff embarked on a comprehensive "bottom-up review" of all the defence needs and programmes for the future years defence plan (FYDP) between FY95 and FY99 shortly after the new Administration took office. According to President Clinton's economic plan entitled "A Vision of Change for America", the Pentagon will request $262.8 billion in 1995, $253.8 billion in 1996, $248.4 billion in 1997 and $254.2 billion in 1998. 112. A central element of the "bottom-up review" of military needs and programmes is a broad plan for reshaping the US armed forces. The five year plan was to be presented to President Clinton in early September. The recommendations of the plan, include an army made up of 10 active divisions, down from the existing 14. (This is 2 fewer than the Bush Administration had planned to keep). Overall troop numbers will shrink from 1.7 million to 1.4 million by 1998. The air force would be cut from its 28 active and reserve wings to 20 - 4 fewer than the Bush Administration had proposed. The Marine Corps would be reduced to 174,000 from its current level of about 180,000 active forces. General Colin Powell had recommended the level of 159,000 during the Bush Administration. 113. The Atlantic Forces will remain the centrepiece of US participation in European security affairs. As a tangible symbol of the US commitment to the Alliance, it will include units stationed in Europe as part of NATO formations. As in the past, there will also be crisis response forces stationed in the United States available for reinforcement. Unlike in the past, however, new US strategic thinking envisions European-based forces as immediately available for use in other regions. The Atlantic Forces are intended to underwrite stability and vital interests in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, as well as Europe. 114. US military forces in Europe are being cut to one-third the strength they had two years ago. Despite this, President Clinton has informed NATO Secretary General, Manfred Worner, that the United States will maintain troop strength in Europe at a level of at least 100,000 for the foreseeable future. At the end of 1991 there were 311,000 US troops in Europe and on 1 March there were 173,000. After the most recent cuts there will be 167,000. According to the Pentagon, the 100,000 level should be reached by 30 September, 1996. On 7 May the United States announced it will close or reduce operations at 46 overseas military sites of which 22 are in Germany, 10 in Great Britain and 3 in Italy. On 1 July the US Department of Defense announced the closure or reduction of operations at another 92 overseas installations (of which 90 are in Europe). This latest announcement has brought the number of bases in Europe where operations have been trimmed since 1990 to 773. 115. The US Army Europe will be undergoing major changes. Under President Clinton's force reduction plans, the US Army Europe's fighting force will be reduced from a Cold War peak of 213,000 to about 65,000. About 94,000 soldiers are currently based with the US Army Europe. Following the completion of the "drawdown", the US Army Europe will consist of two fighting divisions rather than the previous four: the 3rd Infantry division based in Wuerzburg, Germany; and the 1st Armoured Division in Bad Kreuznach. While in peacetime these two divisions remain under US national command, in wartime they become part of two different German-American corps. The 3rd Infantry Division will remain part of the US Army's V Corps headquartered in Frankfurt to be joined by the Bundeswehr's 5th Panzer Division in Dietz. The 1st Armoured Division will be integrated with the II German Korps headquartered in Ulm, Germany. Mr. James Boyle, director of public affairs at US Army Europe headquarters, has recently stressed the need that this new binational structure will have for improved logistics support and communications compatibility.(5) 116. In an intriguing development on the peacekeeping front on September 8, US Defence Secretary Aspin and Russian Defence Minister Grachev signed a memorandum of understanding of the Pentagon for the joint training of a heavy combat division of both sides for the purposes of peacekeeping operations. This initiative was believed to come from Minister Grachev but was enthusiastically embraced by Secretary Aspin. CONCLUSION 117. We are now in a transitional period with an entirely new set of circumstances and contingencies from that which characterized East-West confrontation, one in which the central elements are not all defined and in which there is a new sense of instability and tension. While it is true that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact means that, due to increased warning time, NATO need no longer rely on a forward defence based on a massive concentration of troops, therefore allowing troop reductions below those prescribed by the CFE treaty, it is also true that, as expressed by NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner in a recent debate, "there is a new world, but there is no new world order", and that what we are experiencing is rather "a world in growing disorder". Hence the new dilemmas faced by all NATO nations in the area of force restructuring and force planning. 118. It is generally agreed that, for the foreseeable future, NATO will play an essential role as a forum for concertation between Americans and Europeans and must remain a credible factor for stability in Europe; this sentiment is also held by the Central and Eastern European countries. While it is generally held that these two components - the transatlantic link and a credible military capability - prefigure NATO as the most appropriate instrument to operate under UN or CSCE mandate in crises affecting European security, it is clear that, beyond the increasingly oldfashioned out-of-area debate, it will not be easy to reach the necessary consensus and that eventual interventions might only be possible on an ad hoc basis. In other words, there is a notable reluctancy, and sometimes open opposition, to countenance the possibility of NATO acting as an Alliance and imposing its own solution as such. This is the essence of the delicate debate over whether to use NATO as a decision-making forum, or whether NATO's military capability and experience are its most usable assets. 119. Another element which is affecting the debate on the future of the armed forces in Europe is the lack of clear indications concerning the future European defence policy. If in the Maastricht Treaty there is a clear will to build a European Union with a Common Foreign and Security Policy, there nonetheless remain profound doubts as to whether (and how) such a policy will be given a defence expression in the short to medium term. In the meantime, the widely expressed will to avoid duplication of efforts between NATO and the WEU does not appear to be consistently adhered to (e.g. the implementation of the maritime embargo in the Adriatic Sea). 120. Finally, the UN is itself in the midst of a debate on its role and structure in the new world. The UN Secretary General's "Agenda for Peace" opens new challenges to the organization's members and to the regional organizations with which it could co-operate. The traditional concept of peacekeeping has been altered by situations demanding entirely new approaches (notably Somalia and Bosnia). If the consent of opposing parties will no longer be a prerequisite to collective intervention in the guise of peacekeeping, all considerations in preparing for such missions will be profoundly affected, such as the consensus required, the size of forces, operational controls and rules of engagement. This new parameter will also influence NATO planning, as well as the national planning of those countries willing to make units available for such UN operations, whether under NATO command or not. The whole question of the relationship between NATO and the UN - in operational peacekeeping terms - is still in its primitive stage. 121. In a situation where significant force cuts are being implemented, and under the premise that the earmarking of units for all national, NATO and WEU missions is dismissed, collective consultations and planning, flexible force structures and both national and international interoperability should be addressed as a matter of priority. 122. These are just some of the important issues to which the present transitional phase gives rise. It seems evident that along the path toward a new security and defence order in Europe, we should adhere to the same method of multilateral consultation and co-operation which allowed for the creation of our very successful Alliance. Indeed, the obvious interdependence of Alliance partners often transforms defence matters of a seemingly national nature into issues which concern the collective security of the Alliance as a whole. That said, it is clear that continued reliance on NATO's collective defence planning process is vital. 123. This Report was produced not in an attempt to provide an exhaustive study of national defence plans in this period of profound change in which new, unexpected and unorthodox demands are being placed on our armed forces. Rather, it has endeavoured to summarise key developments occurring in the different Alliance countries in the defence area both for information purposes and to provoke discussion and debate. NOTES AND REFERENCES (1) See Thijs van Vlijmen, ALLIANCE SECURITY: NEW CONTEXT, NEW CHALLENGES, NAA Defence and Security, November 1992. (2) Gen. John M.D.Shalikashvili, "A New NATO in a New Era", NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol.38, no.1, 1993. (3) Gen. Bernard de Bressy (France), "En l'an 2000, les forces armees en Europe occidentale", Defense National, January 1993. (4) "French Parties Called to Arms on Conscription", Financial Times, 12 March 1993. (5) Theresa Hitchens, "U.S. Adjusts to NATO Shifts: Service Faces Shrinking Presence, Multinational Forces", Defense News, 24-30 May 1993.